FOIA 25-244: Ten service slips, thirteen policy manuals, and a $74,520 quote

Watchdog Alerts

Why isn’t this basic information available to the public?

1. The office certified that it keeps no annual summary, no log, no spreadsheet, no tagged database export and no dashboard showing how often it identified or disclosed officer misconduct and Brady/Giglio material. It then quoted $74,520.00 to hand-search the underlying files so that a member of the public could compile those numbers themselves. Which is it: the information does not exist, or it exists but costs more than most people earn in a year to assemble?
2. The same letter granted thirteen written Brady/Giglio policy documents in full, at no charge, and certified that no record exists showing how those written standards were applied. The office can produce its rulebook on demand. It says it cannot produce a single count of the cases the rulebook governed.
3. To answer how many police reports were sent back for correction, the office proposed to review roughly 1,000 files a year for six years at ten minutes each, plus a further 1,000 cases a year for six years, plus 200 cases a year for six years. That is not a records search. That is a re-audit of essentially the entire criminal caseload, priced at $74,520.00 and 180 days after a $37,260.00 deposit.
4. The office's own letter concedes that 'many of the records were not transferred properly from the old system to the new case tracking system,' and that Karpel 'was not utilized' in some of the years requested. It proposes to spend 180 days and $74,520.00 searching records it has already told the public are not reliably searchable.
5. The only Brady/Giglio disclosures the office could point to over a six-year window are ten Proof of Service slips dated between January 2024 and September 2025. Seven of the ten are the same Trooper Immel material re-served to different defense attorneys in eight different cases. If that is the measurable output, what does it say about the system that is supposed to produce it?
6. The denial again cites 'MCL 15.234(1)(s)(ix),' a provision that does not exist, and invokes MCL 15.243(1)(d) 'exempted pursuant to MCL 423.507' without saying what record it covers. The requester asked for a public-interest fee waiver under MCL 15.234(1); the county's itemization leaves the waiver boxes blank and gives no reason.

Timing caveat. ProsecutorByKarpel went live in June 2024. This page does not use the case-management system to judge records from 2020 through May 2024, and it does not treat the absence of Karpel-era statistics as a failure of the system itself. It notes only what the office said in its own letter: that Karpel was not used in some of the years requested, and that records from the prior system were not all transferred.

On October 10, 2025, a requester faxed the Delta County Prosecutor's Office a request for statistics. Not case files, not names, not investigative reports — statistics. How many times, between 2020 and 2025, did the office identify, evaluate, or disclose officer misconduct, credibility problems, or Brady/Giglio material to a defendant? How many police reports came back for correction? What fields in the case-management system carry a Brady or credibility tag? What written test decides whether officer misconduct is “material”? And what do the system's own dashboards say?

The office answered on October 30, 2025. It certified that the annual summaries do not exist. It certified that the logs do not exist. It certified that the tagged exports do not exist. It certified that the dashboards do not exist. It then handed over thirteen Brady/Giglio policy manuals at no charge, produced ten Proof of Service slips as its entire documented record of disclosures across a six-year window, and quoted $74,520.00 — with a $37,260.00 deposit due before anyone would open a file — for the underlying records it would have to read in order to answer the questions itself.

That combination is the story. A public office can lawfully keep no statistics. What it cannot easily do is keep no statistics, charge $74,520 to build them on request, and describe the resulting gap as full compliance. This page reads the 49-page response bundle and the 120-page production page by page, separates what the office certified from what it actually released, and states the arithmetic of the quote exactly as the county wrote it.

Summary

FOIA 25-244 asked five substantive questions and four procedural ones. The substantive questions were all variations on a single theme: show the public the aggregate picture of how this office handles police credibility. The office's answer, item by item, was that no aggregate picture exists in any form it maintains — no annual summary, no log, no spreadsheet, no tagged export, no dashboard. Each of those four certificates is a statement about records, and each is signed by the FOIA coordinator.

Two items were answered differently. Item 4, which asked for the written criteria used to decide whether officer misconduct is “material” under Brady or Giglio, was granted in full: thirteen documents, six dated August 22, 2023 or May 2021 and seven dated April 1, 2025, delivered at no charge. Item 2, which asked for logs of police reports returned for correction, was certified nonexistent as to the logs and separately denied as to any underlying record in which an officer is the named suspect.

For items 2, 3 and 5 the office offered a fallback: it would search the underlying case files and build the answer itself, for a price. That price is where the file becomes remarkable. The county's own Detailed Cost Itemization estimates 8,000 quarter-hour increments to locate records and 4,000 to redact them, at $6.21 per quarter hour, for a subtotal of $74,520.00, an estimated completion of 180 days after deposit, and a 50% good-faith deposit of $37,260.00. Copying is $0. Mailing is $0. The fringe-benefit multiplier is recorded as 0%.

The requester had asked, in the request itself, that all fees be waived under the public-interest provision of MCL 15.234(1). On the county's itemization, the “All fees are waived” box is blank. The “All fees are reduced by” box is blank. The “Subtotal Fees After Waiver” line is blank. The indigence and nonprofit discount boxes are unchecked. Nothing on the form records that a waiver was considered, granted, or denied. That is not a denial of the waiver; it is an absence of any record of a decision.

What was requested

The request is dated October 10, 2025 and arrived by fax at 9:45 that morning; the county's mail system logged it at 9:55. The transmitting station identifier is redacted on the copy published here because it is tied to the requester's fax line. The five numbered categories read, verbatim:

“1. Annual summaries, reports, or internal data compilations (2020-present) showing the number of criminal cases in which the Prosecutor's Office identified, evaluated, or disclosed officer misconduct, credibility issues, or Brady/Giglio material to the defense or the court.

2. Logs, spreadsheets, or tracking records showing instances where police reports or warrant requests were returned for correction, clarification, or re-submission due to inaccurate or incomplete information (2020-present).

3. Any case-tracking spreadsheets, reports, or database exports (from the ProsecutorbyKarpel system) containing fields or tags for ‘Brady,’ ‘Giglio,’ ‘impeachment,’ ‘credibility,’ or ‘law enforcement subject,’ including metadata or field definitions showing the number of cases with these flags per calendar year.

4. Written criteria, decision matrices, or checklists used to determine whether officer misconduct is ‘material’ under Brady or Giglio, including any scoring rubrics or internal review standards.

5. Any statistical reports or dashboards generated by the ProsecutorbyKarpel (PbK) system that summarize case dispositions, declinations, or Brady/Giglio entries for the period 2020 through June 2025.”

The request then narrowed itself, in language that matters to how the exemptions should be read:

“This request is limited to aggregate, administrative, and non-investigative records. It does not seek identifying information about defendants or active cases, any numerical or policy data.”

Four procedural provisions closed the letter. It demanded segregation and release of all reasonably segregable non-exempt material under MCL 15.244(1). It asked for electronic delivery in PDF, CSV, or XLSX. It asked that “all fees be waived under the public-interest provision of MCL 15.234(1).” And it asked for a response within five business days under MCL 15.235(2), or a written notice of any permitted extension.

The narrowing paragraph deserves emphasis because it is the hinge on which the whole response turns. The requester went out of the way to say he was not asking for investigative files, defendant identities, or case-specific material. He was asking for counts. The office's answer treats the counts as nonexistent and the counts' source material as expensive — which means the only way to obtain the numbers is to buy the files that were expressly not requested.

The paper trail

October 10–13, 2025 — the request arrives, and the clock starts twice

Documented: The fax landed on Friday, October 10, 2025 at 9:45 a.m. The county's Notice of Denial form for Request No. 25-244 records “Date Received 10/10/2025.” The response letter, signed October 30, states that the requests were “dated October 10, 2025, received October 13, 2025.” October 13 was the following Monday.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: Five business days from Friday, October 10 runs to Friday, October 17. Five business days from Monday, October 13 runs to Monday, October 20. Add the single permitted ten-business-day extension and the outer ceilings become October 31 and November 3. The response issued October 30 — inside both. The discrepancy therefore decided nothing here. It is recorded because a public body that controls the receipt date controls the deadline, and in this archive that has mattered on other files.

October 16, 2025 — the extension, and what it does not say

Documented: The Notice to Extend Response Time is dated October 16, 2025. It checks the first listed reason: that the county “needs to search for, or review a voluminous amount of separate and distinct public records.” It states an estimated time frame of 10/30/2025. The response letter confirms that “an extension was filed on October 16, 2025 by the Public Body.”

The form also contains a line that reads “Specifically, the County must:” followed by space for an explanation. On this notice that space is blank. The office said the request was voluminous and did not say what it had to search, where, or how long any part would take. That omission is small on its face. It becomes larger when read beside the cost itemization, which claims 8,000 quarter hours of locating work — 2,000 hours — and never identifies a single system, custodian, or file series that the hours attach to.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: The extension is lawful on its face. MCL 15.235(2) permits one extension of up to ten business days for unusual circumstances, and volume is one the statute names. But the extension buys time; it does not substitute for a search description, and it does not validate an estimate. The estimate is a separate document, and it is examined below.

October 30, 2025 — one letter, seven requests

Documented: The response is a single letter signed by Emily Desalvo as FOIA Coordinator, answering requests 25-239 through 25-245. It addresses each request in turn and states a determination for each numbered part. For 25-244 it certifies four categories of records nonexistent, grants one category in full, and conditions three partial grants on payment.

The same bundle contains FOIA 25-245, which asked for press releases and communications about officer misconduct. That request was denied in all five parts as records that do not exist. Read alongside 25-244, the pattern is consistent: on this date the office answered a cluster of transparency requests by certifying that the records behind them do not exist.

What the office produced, and what it certified

Two of the five answers are internally consistent and one is not. Items 1 and 5 are straightforward certificates: the office says it keeps no annual summary and no dashboard, and it says so plainly. Item 4 is a clean grant, and the thirteen documents are real, dated, and in the packet.

Item 3 is the one that does not sit still. The office certified that no case-tracking exports, fields, or tags for Brady, Giglio, impeachment, credibility, or “law enforcement subject” exist. Its explanation is that the terms are not specific enough to identify officers. That is a defensible reading of the words. But the same paragraph then offers to search roughly 1,000 cases a year for six years to find the underlying information — which means the office can identify the records, just not through a field. And the letter concedes something larger in passing: that “many of the records were not transferred properly from the old system to the new case tracking system,” and that Karpel “was not utilized” in some of the years requested.

That concession is the most important sentence in the response. If records were not transferred and the system was not used in some years, then the office's own account of its holdings is incomplete on its face. A certificate of nonexistence is only as good as the search behind it. Here the office has told the requester, in writing, that the search behind it may be looking at an incomplete set.

The ten service slips: what six years of disclosure looks like

Item 1 asked for counts. The office produced ten Proof of Service documents instead — the slips the office files when it serves Brady/Giglio material on a defense attorney. They are the only measurable evidence of disclosure practice in the file, so they are worth reading closely.

Read as a set, the slips say three things.

First, the volume is ten. Not ten per year — ten in total, across a window that begins January 9, 2024 and ends September 19, 2025. The request asked about 2020 through 2025. Nothing before 2024 appears. Whether that is because no Brady material was served before 2024, or because the earlier slips were not located, cannot be determined from the production. The office did not say.

Second, seven of the ten are the same material. The slips referencing Trooper Immel — captioned “Immel — Giglio Concern,” “Trooper Immel 2023 State of Charges Proposed Discipline,” and “C. Immel Brady Material” — account for seven of the ten documents, served across eight case numbers to four different defense attorneys between September 2024 and September 2025. That is one officer's discipline file being re-served, case by case, as new prosecutions arise. It is exactly how a disclosure obligation is supposed to work. It is also not a statistic, and it is not a system.

Third, the paperwork is signed by clerks. The slips carry the signatures of Paige Tardi, identified variously as Office Manager and as Circuit Court & Evidence Clerk, and Angela Cox, Misdemeanor Intake Clerk. The prosecutors of record vary: Beth R. Wickwire on some, Lauren Wickman on others. Nothing improper follows from that. It does show that the disclosure function runs through clerical staff, which is relevant to how a request for “the office's” tracking records should be understood.

The thirteen policy documents granted under item 4 tell a parallel story. The office keeps a substantial, current, professionally produced Brady/Giglio reference library — updated in April 2025, with annotated examples, timing guides, and a violation guide. It will hand all of it over at no charge. What it does not keep is any record of how often the library was used.

The $74,520 quote, line by line

The itemization is a seven-page county form, and it is unusually specific. Line 1 charges $49,680.00 to locate records: 8,000 quarter-hour increments at $6.21 each. Line 2, labor cost for copying, is $0. Line 3a charges $24,840.00 to redact: 4,000 increments at $6.21. Line 3b, contract labor to redact, is $0. Line 4, copying and duplication, is $0. Line 5, mailing, is $0. The subtotal is $74,520.00. The estimated time to complete is 180 days after deposit, and the good-faith deposit required is 50%, or $37,260.00.

The form also states its own inputs. The hourly wage is $24.82. The charge per quarter hour is $6.21, which is $24.82 divided by four. The fringe-benefit multiplier is recorded as 0%, so no fringe was added to the labor rate. That is favorable to the requester and should be said: the county did not load the rate.

What the itemization does not do is attach the hours to anything. The handwritten detail on the accompanying page offers three rough populations: “reviewing approximately 1000 to 1000 cases/year (6 YEARS requested)”; “‘credibility’ or ‘law enforcement subject’ (paragraph 3) 800 cases @ 10 minutes”; and “inaccurate/incomplete information (paragraph 2), 1000 cases @ 10 minutes.” Those are estimates of case volume, not descriptions of a search. No system is named. No custodian is named. No file series is named. And the 8,000 increments of locating time are not derived from the case counts in any way the form shows.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: MCL 15.234 permits a public body to charge for labor to locate, examine, and redact, and to require a good-faith deposit of up to half the estimate. A quote of this size is not unlawful on its face. The statute's constraint is that the estimate must be a reasonable estimate of the actual cost of fulfilling the request. An estimate built on case counts that do not appear in the arithmetic, for a search of a system the letter elsewhere describes as incompletely populated, is an estimate a requester cannot evaluate. That is a transparency problem before it is a legal one.

The waiver that was requested, and the boxes that were left blank

The request asked, in terms, that all fees be waived under the public-interest provision of MCL 15.234(1). The county's itemization contains a section for exactly that decision. On this form:

• The “All fees are waived” box is blank.
• The “All fees are reduced by” box is blank.
• The “Subtotal Fees After Waiver” line is blank.
• The indigence discount box is unchecked.
• The nonprofit discount box is unchecked.

So the form does not grant the waiver, does not reduce the fee, and does not deny the waiver either. It simply does not address it. The response letter does not discuss the waiver request at all. A requester reading the file cannot tell whether the public-interest standard was applied and rejected, or never reached.

This is the point where the fee stops being an accounting question. The stated purpose of the request was public understanding of prosecutorial disclosure practice — the classic public-interest ground. The office's own policy library, produced free under item 4, is built on the premise that disclosure rules matter to the fairness of prosecutions. Charging $74,520 to count how often those rules were used is a choice the office made, and the record shows it made the choice without writing down a reason.

The case for a public ledger

A county prosecutor is an elected official, and the office she runs is paid for by the people she prosecutes. That is not a rhetorical flourish; it is the structure of the job. The prosecutor decides which cases to bring, what to charge, what to offer, and what to hand the defense. Those decisions are made in the public's name and with the public's money. The minimum a democracy should expect in return is the ability to count them.

Nothing in this file suggests that the Delta County Prosecutor's Office hid evidence in any particular case. The ten Proof of Service slips show the opposite: when Brady material existed, it was served, by email, with a slip on file, in eight different cases. That is the conduct of an office doing the thing the Constitution requires. The criticism this record supports is narrower and, in a way, more damning: the office cannot tell the public how often it did the right thing, and it has priced the question at $74,520.

Consider what a public ledger would cost. The office already runs a case-management system. It already produces Proof of Service slips. It already maintains a current Brady/Giglio policy library, updated in April 2025. A single annual page — cases in which Brady or Giglio material was disclosed, cases in which a police report was returned for correction, cases in which an officer's credibility was at issue — would take a clerk a few hours a year to compile from records the office already creates. Instead the office certified that no such page exists, and quoted 3,000 hours to reconstruct one retroactively.

That asymmetry is the finding. It is cheap to keep the count and expensive to reconstruct it. An office that chooses the expensive path, year after year, is choosing not to keep the count. The choice is lawful. It is also a choice the voters are entitled to see, and the only way they can see it is if someone asks and publishes the answer.

The requester in this file asked for counts, not names. He said so explicitly, in a narrowing paragraph that waived investigative files, defendant identities, and case-specific material. The office's response was to certify the counts nonexistent and to price the underlying files. That is a defensible legal position. It is a poor answer to a citizen asking his government how it is doing its most consequential job.

Formal issues in the response

Three points about the form of the answer deserve to be stated precisely, because they concern how the denial is written rather than what it concludes.

First, a citation that does not resolve. The denial paragraph cites “MCL 15.234(1)(s)(ix).” MCL 15.234 is the fee provision of FOIA and has no subsection (s). The same string appears in this archive in FOIA 25-239, answered in the same letter, where it also appears transposed as “MCL 15.243(1)(s)(ix).” The likely explanation is a typographical error carried across a template. But a denial that cites a provision which does not exist is a denial a requester cannot fully evaluate without guessing what was meant.

Second, an exemption cited without explanation. The letter invokes “MCL 15.243(1)(d) exempted pursuant to MCL 423.507.” MCL 423.507 is part of the Public Employment Relations Act. The letter does not say which record the citation applies to or why a labor-relations provision would exempt it. FOIA requires a public body to state the basis for a denial with enough specificity that the requester can decide whether to appeal.

Third, the segregation demand was not answered item by item. The request expressly invoked MCL 15.244(1), which requires a public body to separate exempt from nonexempt material and release the rest. The office applied redactions, which is a form of segregation, and it granted item 4 in full. But it did not say, for any item, how much was redacted or on what basis, and the Notice of Denial's handwritten explanation is general rather than record-specific.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: None of these defects, standing alone, makes the response unlawful. A court might well find substantial compliance, and the exemptions invoked are real. The point is narrower: the answer is hard to test. A requester cannot tell from this letter which record was withheld under which exemption, how much of each was redacted, or whether the segregation demanded actually happened. That is a transparency problem even where the legal result is correct.

The pattern across the October 10 batch

FOIA 25-244 was one of seven requests filed the same day and answered in the same letter. Read together, they describe an office that answers transparency questions about police accountability by certifying that the underlying records do not exist.

FOIA 25-239, already in this archive, asked for any list or record identifying officers with sustained credibility findings. The office granted it in part, produced 137 pages, and explained that it collects credibility information case by case as defense counsel asks. FOIA 25-240 asked how the office reviews officer use-of-force and received three certificates of nonexistence plus a $1,863.00 estimate with a $931.50 deposit. FOIA 25-245 asked for press releases and communications about officer misconduct and was denied in all five parts as records that do not exist. FOIA 25-244 asked for the statistics behind all of it and received four certificates, one clean grant of policy manuals, and a $74,520 quote.

The contrast between 25-239 and 25-244 is the sharpest in the archive. In 25-239 the office said it has no maintained list and instead requests information as it becomes known. In 25-244 it certified that no statistics exist and offered to build them for $74,520. Those two answers are consistent with each other — an office without a list also has nothing to count — and together they describe a system that depends entirely on the memory and diligence of individual prosecutors and clerks. The ten service slips are what that system produces. They are honest work. They are not a record.

Authorities consulted

Show the statutes, cases, and sources cited on this page

The statutory analysis above rests on the text of the Michigan Freedom of Information Act as published by the Michigan Legislature. The provisions most directly engaged are MCL 15.231 (definitions), MCL 15.233 (obligation to provide records or certify nonexistence), MCL 15.234 (fees, labor charges, deposits, and the public-interest waiver the requester invoked), MCL 15.235 (five business days and one extension of up to ten business days), MCL 15.240 (written appeal and 180-day civil action), MCL 15.243 (exemptions, including subsections (1)(a), (1)(b)(iii), (1)(d), and (1)(w)), and MCL 15.244 (segregation and release of the remainder).

The Brady and Giglio framework is drawn from the cases and materials the office itself produced under item 4: Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); People v. Chenault, 495 Mich. 142 (2014); and MCR 6.201. The produced set also cites Joseph v. Coyle, 469 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2006), and the Prosecuting Attorneys Coordinating Council's Brady & Giglio: A Prosecutor's Guide (May 2021).

Fee figures are taken from the Delta County FOIA Detailed Cost Itemization Form dated October 30, 2025, and were verified against page images of the form rather than optical text alone, because the form's line numbering is easy to misread: the $24,840.00 appears on line 3a, labor cost to redact, not on the copying line.

What would change this picture

Three things would resolve most of the open questions on this page, and none requires a new legal theory.

First, a single year of the count the request asked for — any year, any format, however rough. If the office produced one page showing how many cases in 2024 involved a Brady or Giglio disclosure, the certificate of nonexistence would be tested without argument about characterization.

Second, the search description behind the certificates. FOIA does not require a public body to narrate its search, but a certificate that says “no such records exist” is far more persuasive when it says which systems and custodians were checked — particularly where the same letter concedes that records were not all transferred and that the case system was not used in some years.

Third, a written decision on the fee waiver. The itemization has a section for it. Filling in the boxes, either way, would tell the requester and the public whether the public-interest standard was applied.

Open questions

• Were any Brady or Giglio disclosures made before January 2024, and if so why do no Proof of Service slips for them appear in the production?
• What systems and custodians were searched before the office certified that no annual summary, log, tagged export, or dashboard exists?
• How were the 8,000 quarter-hour increments of locating time derived, given that the handwritten case counts do not produce that figure?
• Was the MCL 15.234(1) public-interest waiver considered, and where is the record of that decision?
• What record is withheld under MCL 15.243(1)(d) “exempted pursuant to MCL 423.507,” and why is the citation unexplained?
• Which years was the ProsecutorByKarpel system not utilized, and which records were not transferred from the prior system?
• How does the office reconcile item 3's certificate that no credibility tags exist with its offer to search 1,000 cases a year for the same information?

Documents

These are redacted copies prepared for publication. Requester names, home addresses, personal phone numbers, and email addresses have been removed. Unredacted originals are not hosted on the public web server.

Related FOIA requests

• FOIA 26-292 — FOIA 26-292: The office used the requester's own cost-saving clause to withdraw the request, then offered to grant it if he removed the clause (Granted in part, denied in part — no records produced; the office conceded the data exists and refused the aggregate on the ground that the requester's own scope limitation excluded it, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-291 — FOIA 26-291: The office answered a request for a privilege log with nine document titles — and cited a subsection of the FOIA that does not exist (Granted in part — a nine-row title-and-date table supplying two of the eleven requested fields, no count, and a citation to a subsection of MCL 15.243 that does not exist, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-290 — FOIA 26-290: The office refused the victim-services records because it says you already have them — from a packet that contained none (Refused — five paragraphs labelled “granted” but zero pages produced, on the authority of a prior production that contained no responsive documents; the sixth paragraph received no disposition, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-131 — FOIA 26-131: Twenty case files, priced at $82.66 before a single page is copied (Granted in part — release conditioned on a $41.33 deposit; no records produced yet, April 17, 2026)
• FOIA 26-35 — FOIA 26-35: The office counted 52 pleas in 85 minutes — eight days after saying the same kind of aggregate did not exist (Granted — 52 pleas reported from the District and Circuit Court dockets, no fee quoted, no exemption cited, no pages withheld; the count is over-inclusive by the office's own admission, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-34 — FOIA 26-34: The office denied a count of diversion cases by defining “diversion” down to a programme it does not run (Denied — certificate of nonexistence under MCL 15.233(1), Denial Form box 2 checked, on the ground that the only diversion programme in Delta County is juvenile diversion administered by the Probate Court; no exemption cited, no fee quoted, no waiver determination, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-33 — FOIA 26-33: Asked to count deferred prosecution agreements, the office certified the total nonexistent and priced the underlying data at $9,093.33 (Granted in part and denied in part — the aggregate record denied as requiring creation of a new record, with a certificate of nonexistence and Denial Form box 2 checked; the underlying data granted subject to a $9,093.33 estimate, a $4,546.66 deposit and a 270-day production estimate; public-interest fee waiver left undetermined, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-32 — FOIA 26-32: What the office's own memos say about the migration that broke its records — a 95-page production that answers its own denial (Granted in part, denied in part — five records produced across 95 pages, with only personal contact information redacted under MCL 15.243(1)(a); no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-31 — FOIA 26-31: Asked how many crime scenes a prosecutor attended, the office listed eight documents and denied them as duplicative (Denied in full — refused as a duplicative request under Densmore v Department of Corrections, on the ground that the eight listed records were already produced in response to FOIA 25-267; Denial Form box 1 checked with the section 13 subsection left blank; no aggregate figure supplied and no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-30 — FOIA 26-30: Eight documents, one number, and a Densmore refusal built on a premise the record does not fully support (Denied — no aggregate total produced; eight responsive documents identified but not reproduced under a Densmore prior-production rationale; no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-29 — FOIA 26-29: A count of inherited convictions the office could not locate — priced at $1,033.33 for the work of counting (No count produced — office could not locate a record; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,033.33 with a $516.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
• FOIA 26-28 — FOIA 26-28: A headcount of cases open when the prosecutor took office — denied, then priced at $1,653.33 on an 800-file baseline (Denied in part, granted in part — no record states the headcount, with a certificate of nonexistence; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,653.33 with an $826.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
• FOIA 26-22 — FOIA 26-22: A conviction rate the office says does not exist, priced at $9,548 (Denied — record does not exist; $9,548 quote for the underlying files, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 26-21 — FOIA 26-21: A count of convictions the office says does not exist — then a quiet amendment that changed the number behind the bill (Denied as a compilation — no count produced; fee of $9,548.00 quoted for underlying files; amended response revised the volume figure without explanation, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 26-20 — FOIA 26-20: The aggregate case total, and the records that would let you count it (Denied — record does not exist, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 25-279 — FOIA 25-279: The office granted the personnel and budget records on paper — then sent three invoices totaling $34,673.79 and none of the records (Granted in part on paper — dozens of records listed as enclosed and none enclosed; three cost itemizations totaling $34,673.79, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-278 — FOIA 25-278: The office says it never tracked plea bargaining — then bills $23,146.66 for a 4,000-file review it says is already covered by another invoice (Granted in part — 62 trials produced from the calendar; plea-offer data certified not to exist; a $23,146.66 estimate the office says is moot if the twin invoice is paid, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-277 — FOIA 25-277: No annual statistical report exists, the underlying data does, and the office prices it at $34,720 (Granted in part — no statistical report exists; the underlying data is granted at a $34,720 estimate built on a volume figure the office has never counted, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-257 — FOIA 25-257: Three certificates of nonexistence, then a $19,840 bill to rebuild the data by hand (Denied — three certificates of nonexistence, with a $19,840 estimate to rebuild the same data by hand, October 31, 2025)
• FOIA 25-254 — FOIA 25-254: Two certificates of nonexistence, two documents produced, and a $74,520 itemization copied from an earlier request (Granted in part, denied in part — two documents produced, two certificates of nonexistence, and a $74,520 estimate identical to FOIA 25-244's, October 31, 2025)
• FOIA 25-241 — FOIA 25-241: The special-prosecutor petition the office filed, and the 2024 memo that says it did not need another one (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-240 — FOIA 25-240: Officer use-of-force referrals, and the $1,863 bill for the one part the office would search (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-239 — FOIA 25-239: The Brady/Giglio list and how the office tracks officer credibility (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-234 — FOIA 25-234: Four lab reports, two certificates, and 26.4 grams where the press said four ounces (Granted in part, October 1, 2025)
• FOIA 25-202 — FOIA 25-202: No RFP, no bid, no purchase order — and the emails that show how the system was picked (Granted in part, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-201 — FOIA 25-201: ProsecutorByKarpel contracts, invoices, and licensing (Granted in part, denied in part, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-200 — FOIA 25-200: The software the office runs on — seven systems named, one of them retired in June 2024 (Granted in full, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-197 — FOIA 25-197: A request for complaints against the office came back as the office's own civil-rights lawsuits (Granted in part, denied in part, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-196 — FOIA 25-196: Audits of the office, 2019 through 2024 — five county financial statements produced, two fiscal years missing (Granted in part — five annual county financial statements produced; fiscal years 2022 and 2024 absent from the release; no exemption cited and no certificate of nonexistence, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-195 — FOIA 25-195: Reports on the office's own work — four case-tracking reports produced, performance reviews certified nonexistent, county reports withheld as attorney-client (Granted in part and denied in part — ten documents produced; county reports withheld on attorney-client privilege; performance reviews certified nonexistent; $5,961.60 estimated, $2,980.80 deposit, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-194 — FOIA 25-194: Every email and text the Prosecutor sent in 2024 — a $63,028.80 estimate on a request the requester offered to narrow (Granted in part and denied in part — exemptions cited; $63,028.80 estimated, $31,514.40 deposit required, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-215 — FOIA 25-215: Three answers to one request — two certificates of nonexistence, a grant, and a $13,248 estimate (Granted in part, August 9, 2025)
• FOIA 25-180 — FOIA 25-180: Two boxes checked — the trial records both “already provided” and “do not exist” (Denied in full — certificate of nonexistence plus an exemption box checked; no fee, no pages produced, August 2, 2025)
• FOIA 25-139 — FOIA 25-139: Forfeitures in cases that ended without a conviction, certified not to exist — while the same office took an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-137 — FOIA 25-137: The average time from charge to disposition, certified not to exist — after a ten-day extension for “voluminous” records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-136 — FOIA 25-136: The plea-agreement count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-135 — FOIA 25-135: The office denied the 2024 trial summary as a record that “does not exist” — then produced eight case files on the next page (Granted in part — 8 case files produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-134 — FOIA 25-134: The dismissed-case count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-133 — FOIA 25-133: The office certified the monthly count did not exist — then attached an annual one and offered to sell the underlying data for $2,815.20 (Granted in part — one annual screening table produced; monthly counts withheld; $2,815.20 quoted with a $1,407.60 deposit, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-129 — FOIA 25-129: Arraignment-to-disposition times the office certified do not exist, then priced at $2,931.12 (Granted in part — two items denied as nonexistent; $2,931.12 quote on the third, June 26, 2025)
• FOIA 25-118 — FOIA 25-118: Final case outcomes for January and February 2025 (Fee estimate issued, June 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-94 — Prosecutor Case Outcome Statistics, 2021–2025 (Granted in Part, May 23, 2025)