FOIA 26-34: The office denied a count of diversion cases by defining “diversion” down to a programme it does not run

Watchdog Alerts

Why isn’t this basic information available to the public?

1. The office did not cite an exemption and did not say it searched and found nothing. It redefined the word: “diversion programs” means, in its reading, juvenile diversion administered by the Probate Court under MCL 722.821 et seq., and “There are no other ‘diversion programs’ within Delta County.” The denial rests on that definition, not on a search.
2. The packet carries three different dates for one fax. The request form is dated February 9 and the office's own fax notification logs it at 1:18:09 p.m. on February 9. The Denial Form records “Date Received 02/10/2026.” The response letter says the request was “received … on February 17, 2026.”
3. This is the sibling of FOIA 26-35. Both were faxed to the same office on the afternoon of February 9, 2026, both were answered on February 17 by the same coordinator, and both letters open with the same wrong date. 26-35 was granted in full and produced a number. 26-34 was denied outright.
4. The office asserts that “There are no other ‘diversion programs’ within Delta County” without describing a search, naming a custodian, or listing the programmes it checked. The certificate says a search was made; the letter does not say what was searched.
5. The fee waiver was requested under MCL 15.234 and never decided — neither granted nor denied in writing. No fee attached because nothing was produced, but the statutory request is unanswered.
6. The office closed by inviting clarification and offering to “review the matter anew.” That is better practice than most denials in this archive, and it is also an admission that the door is not shut — the requester simply has to guess the word the office will accept.

Timing caveat. Nothing on this page faults the office for adopting ProsecutorByKarpel in June 2024 or for the migration being difficult, and nothing on this page depends on the migration at all. The denial in 26-34 is definitional: the office says the category of record does not exist in Delta County. That is a statement about programmes, not about software, and it is treated here on its own terms.

On February 9, 2026, a requester faxed the Delta County Prosecutor's Office a one-page request for a single number: how many criminal cases were resolved through diversion programs between 2022 and 2025. Four minutes later an e-mail supplied the date range the request had left out. The office answered on February 17, 2026, and it denied the request — not by citing an exemption, and not by saying it had searched and found nothing, but by redefining the word. “Diversion programs,” the office wrote, is “traditionally a program only referring to juvenile diversion program administered by Probate Courts,” and “There are no other ‘diversion programs’ within Delta County.” On that premise it certified that no responsive record exists and checked box 2 on the Denial Form.

The denial is worth reading closely, because it is the most courteous document in this archive and one of the least answerable. It explains itself, cites the statute it is relying on, tells the requester where the records it does not hold are kept, encloses the appeal form, and closes by inviting clarification and offering to “review the matter anew.” None of that is required by the Act in this detail, and it should be credited. What the letter never does is say what it searched, or why the requester's ordinary use of the word “diversion” should be replaced by the office's narrower one.

Summary

Three numbers organise this file. One is the number of pages faxed, at 1:18:09 p.m. on February 9, 2026, according to the office's own fax notification. Zero is the number of responsive records produced. Three is the number of different dates the packet gives for when that one-page fax arrived.

The third number is the reason the file is in the archive. The request form is dated February 9, 2026. The fax notification the office itself enclosed logs the transmission at 1:18:09 p.m. on February 9, 2026. The Notice of Denial form records “Date Received: 02/10/2026.” And the response letter states that the request was “dated February 10, 2026, and received by the Delta County Prosecutor's Office on February 17, 2026.” One fax, one envelope, three dates, and the office's own fax log contradicts two of them.

The response is timely on any of the three readings, and this page says so plainly. Counted from February 9 and excluding the weekend and the February 16 state holiday, the fifth business day is February 17. Counted from February 10, it is also February 17. The date confusion therefore costs the requester nothing in this file. It matters for a different reason: it is the second time in eight days that the same office, through the same coordinator, has described the same afternoon's faxes with dates that its own attachments contradict. The sibling request is FOIA 26-35, and it is discussed below.

What was requested

The request is headed “Request for Aggregate Criminal Case Statistics” and asks for one line of data: the “Total number of criminal cases resolved through diversion programs,” in “Aggregate numerical data only.” It contains the sentence this archive has now seen in six consecutive statistical requests: “If no such calculation is maintained, please indicate that no responsive record exists. This request does not require creation of a new record.” It asks for a fee waiver under MCL 15.234 and a written estimate if any fee is anticipated, and it asks for a response within five business days under MCL 15.235(2).

The date range was supplied separately. The forwarded e-mail in the packet, sent at 1:19 p.m. Eastern on February 9 and passed to the coordinator at 1:22 p.m., reads: “I sent in two FOIA requests but realized I didn't put the dates that I am requesting. If I need to send a new one, please advise, if not the dates requested are from 2022-2025.” The office quotes that e-mail in full in its response letter, so there is no dispute that it was received and understood.

What the office answered

The letter acknowledges the request, quotes it, quotes the clarification, and then explains its reading of the operative word. The passage is short enough to set out whole:

“In reviewing the request, in particular the use of the term ‘diversion programs’, it should be noted that ‘diversion programs’ is traditionally a program only referring to juvenile diversion program administered by Probate Courts, as outlined in the Juvenile Diversion Act, Act 13 of 1988, MCL 722.821 et al. Records pertaining to juvenile diversion programs are maintained by the Probate Court of the juvenile's respective county. The Delta County Prosecutor's Office does not maintain records related to individuals placed within a juvenile diversion program, as the files from Probate Court are considered confidential under the law, even to the Prosecutor's Office. There are no other ‘diversion programs’ within Delta County. Should you have clarifying information related to this request, please provide that information or clarification and we will review the matter anew.”

Then the operative sentence: “As such, your request for the above records is DENIED.” It is followed by a certificate that, “after a search for records and to the best of the undersigned's knowledge and belief, the public record requested, and described above, does not exist within the records of the public body under the name nor any other name reasonably known to the public body.” The attached Notice of Denial, dated 02/17/2026, checks box 2: “Record Does Not Exist.” No exemption is cited anywhere in the packet.

The denial is a definition, not a search

Most denials in this archive are answered by a certificate that stands alone. This one is different, and the difference is to the office's credit: it explains itself. The explanation, however, is not a description of a search. It is a proposition about what the words in the request mean.

The office's chain of reasoning has four links. First, “diversion programs” refers to juvenile diversion administered by Probate Courts under the Juvenile Diversion Act. Second, those records are held by the Probate Court, not the Prosecutor. Third, those records are confidential even to the Prosecutor. Fourth, “There are no other ‘diversion programs’ within Delta County.” If all four are true, the conclusion follows: the office holds no responsive record, and MCL 15.233(1) requires it to say so. On its own terms the denial is coherent, and this page does not pretend otherwise.

What the letter does not do is support the fourth link. “There are no other ‘diversion programs’ within Delta County” is a factual assertion about every programme in the county, made without a list of programmes checked, without a custodian consulted, and without a citation. The certificate says a search was made. The letter does not say what was searched, which is the one thing that would let a reader test the assertion.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: Michigan law provides several post-charge dispositions that are commonly described as diversion and that are not juvenile diversion under the Juvenile Diversion Act. The Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, MCL 762.11 et seq., allows a court to assign a defendant between 17 and 23 years of age to youthful trainee status and to dismiss the case on successful completion. MCL 333.7411 permits a court to defer proceedings and discharge a first-time controlled-substance offender without adjudication. MCL 769.4a does the same for a first offence involving domestic violence. None of these is administered by the Probate Court, all of them resolve a criminal case without a conviction, and in ordinary usage all of them are called diversion. The letter's definition does not mention any of them, and the record does not say whether the office participates in any of them. That is a question the packet leaves open, not a finding this page makes.

There is a second, subtler effect of a definitional denial. When a public body says “we searched and found nothing,” the requester can argue about the search: the wrong system, the wrong custodian, the wrong date range. When a public body says “the thing you named does not exist here,” the argument moves to vocabulary. The requester must now guess which word the office will accept. The letter's closing invitation — “provide that information or clarification and we will review the matter anew” — is generous in form and, in practice, asks the requester to supply the office's own definition back to it.

One fax, three dates

The packet is eleven pages. Four of them carry a date for the same event, and they do not agree.

When the request arrived, according to the office's own packet

Source	Page	What it says
Request form	10	“Date: February 9, 2026”
IPFone fax notification	8–9	“Receive time 2.9.2026 01:18:09 PM -05:00,” 1 page
Forwarded clarification e-mail	11	Sent “Monday, 9 February 2026 1:19 PM EST”; forwarded to the coordinator 1:22 PM
Notice of Denial form	3	“Date Received: 02/10/2026”
Response letter	1	Request “dated February 10, 2026, and received … on February 17, 2026”

The letter's own sentence contains two errors in twelve words. The request is dated February 9, not February 10. And the request was received February 9, not February 17 — a date on which the office was writing the letter, not opening the envelope. The Denial Form, generated the same day, uses a third date: February 10.

It is worth being fair about what this does and does not show. A receipt date of February 10 is the ordinary product of a fax arriving late in the afternoon and being logged into the case system the next morning; the office's own e-mail says “Tracy has not yet assigned a number” at 1:22 p.m., which is consistent with a number being assigned the following day. That is a clerical convention, not a deception. What cannot be explained that way is the letter's statement that the request was received on February 17. That is the date of the response, not the date of receipt, and it appears in a paragraph whose function is to establish, on the record, when the statutory clock started.

The clock itself is not in dispute. On any of the three dates, February 17 is the fifth business day, because February 16, 2026 was a state holiday. The response is timely, and this page records that without qualification. The error matters because it is the second instance in eight days of the same office describing the same afternoon's faxes with dates its own attachments contradict — and because the office's record of its own receipt dates is the foundation on which every timeliness claim in this archive rests.

The same fax, answered twice

FOIA 26-34 did not arrive alone. It arrived with FOIA 26-35, which asked for the number of plea agreements entered into and accepted in January 2026. The two requests were faxed to the same office on the same afternoon, logged by the same fax service, clarified in the same e-mail, and answered on the same day by the same coordinator. Both response letters open with the identical sentence, including the identical wrong date.

The outcomes could not be more different. 26-35 was granted in full. The office read the District and Circuit Court dockets, counted 52 pleas, disclosed that the count included misdemeanor traffic tickets and was therefore over-inclusive, charged nothing, and reported that the review took approximately 85 minutes. 26-34 was denied outright, on the ground that the category of record does not exist in Delta County.

That contrast is not hypocrisy, and this page will not present it as such. The two requests asked about different things, and the office's answer to each is internally consistent: pleas are recorded on a public docket the office can read, and juvenile diversion records are held by a court that will not release them. What the contrast does show is that the office is capable of producing an aggregate in under ninety minutes when the underlying facts are written down somewhere it can reach. The question 26-34 leaves open is whether the diversion numbers are genuinely unreachable or merely stored in a form the office chose not to search — and the packet does not answer it.

There is one further detail worth recording. The 26-35 letter contains the sentence “there does not exist a document or record of an ‘aggregate numerical total’ of plea agreements entered into and accepted” — and then supplies the total anyway. The 26-34 letter contains no such sentence. It does not say the office searched and found no tally; it says the category does not exist. Those are different claims, and only the second one forecloses the question entirely.

The waiver that was never decided

The request asked for “a waiver of all fees pursuant to MCL 15.234” and for a written estimate if any fee was anticipated. The response letter does not mention the waiver. It does not grant it, does not deny it, and does not cite MCL 15.234 in either direction.

Because the request was denied, no fee could attach, so the silence has no practical cost in this file. But it is still an undecided statutory request, and it is the same silence the Wickman Record tracks as Pattern 07 across the rest of the archive. An office that denies a request outright has no reason not to write one sentence saying the waiver is moot. The absence of that sentence is a small thing. It is also the seventh or eighth small thing of its kind in a row, and the accumulation is the point.

The timeline

FOIA 26-34, dated

Date	Event	Source
February 9, 2026, 1:18 p.m.	Request faxed; one page received on the office's fax line	Request form; IPFone notification
February 9, 2026, 1:19 p.m.	Clarification e-mail sent, supplying the 2022–2025 date range	Forwarded e-mail, page 11
February 9, 2026, 1:22 p.m.	Coordinator forwards the clarification to the prosecutor and staff; “Tracy has not yet assigned a number”	Forwarded e-mail, page 11
February 10, 2026	Date the office says the request bears, and the date the Denial Form records as received	Response letter; Denial Form
February 16, 2026	State holiday; not a business day	Calendar
February 17, 2026	Response letter and Notice of Denial dated; request denied; certificate of nonexistence; box 2 checked	Response letter; Denial Form
February 17, 2026	Date the office says the request was received	Response letter

What the record shows

The denial is explained, and that is rare here. The office did not send a bare certificate. It named the statute it was relying on, identified the court that holds the records, explained why it could not obtain them, and invited further clarification. Several files in this archive would be materially better if they had been written this way.

The explanation is a definition, not a search. The letter asserts that no other diversion programme exists in Delta County without listing the programmes it checked or the custodian it asked. The certificate says a search occurred; the letter does not describe it.

The definition is narrower than the word. The office equates “diversion programs” with juvenile diversion under the Juvenile Diversion Act. Michigan law also provides for youthful-trainee status, drug deferrals and domestic-violence deferrals, each of which resolves a criminal case without a conviction and each of which is commonly called diversion. The letter does not address them, and the record does not say whether the office uses them.

The packet cannot agree on when the request arrived. February 9 on the form and the fax log, February 10 on the Denial Form, February 17 in the letter. The response was timely on all three readings, but the office's record of its own receipt date is wrong in two of the three places it appears.

The fee waiver was never decided. Neither granted nor denied, and not declared moot.

The invitation to clarify is real but one-sided. The office offers to “review the matter anew” if the requester supplies “clarifying information.” It does not say what clarification would change the outcome, which leaves the requester to guess the definition the office will accept.

The word the office defined for you

There is a kind of denial that is harder to argue with than a lie, and this is it. A false statement can be disproved. A definition cannot, because a definition is not a claim about the world; it is a claim about what a word will be allowed to mean inside a particular building. When the Delta County Prosecutor's Office wrote that “diversion programs” refers to juvenile diversion administered by the Probate Court, it did not have to show that no diversion records exist. It only had to show that the records the requester had in mind were not the records the office had decided the word referred to.

That move is legal, and it is not obviously wrong. The Juvenile Diversion Act is real, it is administered by probate courts, and its records are confidential. If the requester meant juvenile diversion, the office's answer is correct and the certificate is the right instrument. The trouble is that the requester did not say juvenile diversion. The request said “criminal cases resolved through diversion programs,” which in ordinary prosecutorial usage includes the deferrals that end a case without a conviction — youthful trainee status, drug deferrals, domestic-violence deferrals. Those are not probate programmes. They are dispositions a prosecutor's office either uses or does not use, and whether Delta County uses them is a fact the office knows and the public does not.

The letter could have answered that question in one sentence. “This office does not participate in youthful trainee, 7411 or 769.4a deferrals,” or “this office does, and here is the count.” Either sentence would have closed the file. Instead the letter defined the word so that the question could not be asked, and then offered to reopen the matter if the requester supplied a better word. That is not obstruction. It is something more ordinary and, in a records office, more corrosive: it is the quiet transfer of the burden of vocabulary from the body that holds the records to the person who asked for them.

Set that beside the sibling request and the picture sharpens. FOIA 26-35 asked how many pleas were entered in January, and the office answered 52 in 85 minutes, free, and volunteered that the number was over-inclusive. Nobody redefined “plea.” Nobody asked the requester to clarify what a plea agreement was. The office read the docket and gave the number. Eight days later, or the same day depending on which date in the packet you believe, the same office, through the same coordinator, answered a request for a different count by explaining that the count did not exist because the word did not mean what the requester thought.

Both answers may be correct. That is what makes the pattern worth documenting rather than denouncing. The office is not refusing to count; it is choosing, case by case, whether the question as asked is a question it recognises. When the data sits on a court docket, it recognises the question and answers it. When the data would require the office to describe its own charging practices, it recognises a narrower question and answers that instead. The public cannot see the rule that decides which is which, because no such rule has been written down. What the public can see is a fax log that says February 9, a denial form that says February 10, and a letter that says February 17 — three dates, one envelope, and an office asking to be trusted about the rest.

The fairest reading is also the least comfortable one. This is not a cover-up. It is a records office doing the minimum that the statute, read narrowly, permits, and doing it politely. The letter is courteous, it cites its authority, it encloses the appeal form, and it invites a follow-up. A requester who wanted the number would have to write again, name the specific deferral statutes, and hope the office accepted the new vocabulary. Most requesters will not. That is how a definitional denial works: it does not slam the door, it relabels it, and it waits for the person outside to give up.

What this record does not show

This page does not show that Delta County operates any diversion programme other than juvenile diversion. The office says it does not, and nothing in the packet contradicts that. The point about youthful trainee status, drug deferrals and domestic-violence deferrals is that the letter does not address them, not that the office uses them.

It does not show that the office was legally required to produce a count. If no responsive record exists, MCL 15.233(1) requires exactly the certificate the office issued, and the Act does not oblige a public body to create a record it does not maintain. The request itself said so.

It does not show that the receipt-date confusion was deliberate. A fax logged the next morning is ordinary practice, and the February 17 statement in the letter is most likely a template error carried over from the sibling response. What the record shows is that the error runs in the direction that makes the office look faster, and that the office's own fax log contradicts it.

It does not show that the fee waiver should have been granted. No fee attached, so the outcome a waiver would have produced is the outcome that occurred.

It does not show that an appeal would have succeeded. The appeal would turn on whether the office's definition of “diversion” is the right one, and this page takes no position on that question.

What to ask next

The obvious follow-up is to remove the ambiguity the office relied on. A request that names the specific dispositions — youthful trainee status under MCL 762.11, deferrals under MCL 333.7411 and MCL 769.4a, and any other post-charge alternative the office uses — and asks for the count of each, 2022 through 2025, cannot be answered by redefining “diversion.” Either the office uses them and can count them, or it does not and can say so in one line.

The second follow-up is the search itself. The certificate says a search was made. Ask the office to describe it: which systems were queried, which custodians were asked, what date range was applied, and whether the Probate Court was contacted. A search description is a record, and it is the record that would let a reader test the assertion that no other programme exists.

The third is the programme inventory. Ask for any list, memorandum, policy or grant application that names the post-charge alternatives the office operates or participates in. If there is no such document, that answer is itself informative.

The fourth is smaller and applies to the whole archive. Ask the office to state, in writing, its policy for recording the receipt date of a fax, and to confirm which of the three dates in this packet is the one it treats as the start of the statutory clock. The answer would be useful in every future file, and it would cost the office a paragraph.

Authorities and sources cited on this page

Show the statutes, cases, and sources cited on this page

Michigan Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 et seq.; MCL 15.233(1) (certificate that a public record does not exist under the name given or any other name reasonably known, the authority for the certificate issued here); MCL 15.234 (fee waiver and reduction, invoked by the request and never decided); MCL 15.235(2) (five-business-day response period, cited by the request); MCL 15.240 (appeal to the chairperson of the county board of commissioners or judicial review in circuit court, as stated in the response letter, together with the statutory note that a prevailing requester may recover attorney fees, costs and disbursements, actual or compensatory damages, and punitive damages of $1,000.00).

Juvenile Diversion Act, Act 13 of 1988, MCL 722.821 et seq., cited by the office as the source of its definition. Holmes Youthful Trainee Act, MCL 762.11 et seq.; MCL 333.7411 (controlled-substance deferral); MCL 769.4a (domestic-violence deferral) — cited here only to show the range of dispositions commonly called diversion, none of which the letter addresses.

Documents relied on: the February 17, 2026 response letter (two pages); the Notice of Denial form dated 02/17/2026; the excerpt of MCL 15.240; the blank Denial Appeal Form; the county's FOIA policy notice; the IPFone fax notification recording one page at 1:18:09 p.m. on February 9, 2026; the request form dated February 9, 2026; and the forwarded clarification e-mail. All eleven pages are published below with the requester's identifying information redacted.

Documents

These are redacted copies prepared for publication. Requester names, home addresses, personal phone numbers, and email addresses have been removed. Unredacted originals are not hosted on the public web server.

Related FOIA requests

• FOIA 26-292 — FOIA 26-292: The office used the requester's own cost-saving clause to withdraw the request, then offered to grant it if he removed the clause (Granted in part, denied in part — no records produced; the office conceded the data exists and refused the aggregate on the ground that the requester's own scope limitation excluded it, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-291 — FOIA 26-291: The office answered a request for a privilege log with nine document titles — and cited a subsection of the FOIA that does not exist (Granted in part — a nine-row title-and-date table supplying two of the eleven requested fields, no count, and a citation to a subsection of MCL 15.243 that does not exist, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-290 — FOIA 26-290: The office refused the victim-services records because it says you already have them — from a packet that contained none (Refused — five paragraphs labelled “granted” but zero pages produced, on the authority of a prior production that contained no responsive documents; the sixth paragraph received no disposition, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-131 — FOIA 26-131: Twenty case files, priced at $82.66 before a single page is copied (Granted in part — release conditioned on a $41.33 deposit; no records produced yet, April 17, 2026)
• FOIA 26-35 — FOIA 26-35: The office counted 52 pleas in 85 minutes — eight days after saying the same kind of aggregate did not exist (Granted — 52 pleas reported from the District and Circuit Court dockets, no fee quoted, no exemption cited, no pages withheld; the count is over-inclusive by the office's own admission, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-33 — FOIA 26-33: Asked to count deferred prosecution agreements, the office certified the total nonexistent and priced the underlying data at $9,093.33 (Granted in part and denied in part — the aggregate record denied as requiring creation of a new record, with a certificate of nonexistence and Denial Form box 2 checked; the underlying data granted subject to a $9,093.33 estimate, a $4,546.66 deposit and a 270-day production estimate; public-interest fee waiver left undetermined, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-32 — FOIA 26-32: What the office's own memos say about the migration that broke its records — a 95-page production that answers its own denial (Granted in part, denied in part — five records produced across 95 pages, with only personal contact information redacted under MCL 15.243(1)(a); no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-31 — FOIA 26-31: Asked how many crime scenes a prosecutor attended, the office listed eight documents and denied them as duplicative (Denied in full — refused as a duplicative request under Densmore v Department of Corrections, on the ground that the eight listed records were already produced in response to FOIA 25-267; Denial Form box 1 checked with the section 13 subsection left blank; no aggregate figure supplied and no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-30 — FOIA 26-30: Eight documents, one number, and a Densmore refusal built on a premise the record does not fully support (Denied — no aggregate total produced; eight responsive documents identified but not reproduced under a Densmore prior-production rationale; no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-29 — FOIA 26-29: A count of inherited convictions the office could not locate — priced at $1,033.33 for the work of counting (No count produced — office could not locate a record; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,033.33 with a $516.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
• FOIA 26-28 — FOIA 26-28: A headcount of cases open when the prosecutor took office — denied, then priced at $1,653.33 on an 800-file baseline (Denied in part, granted in part — no record states the headcount, with a certificate of nonexistence; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,653.33 with an $826.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
• FOIA 26-22 — FOIA 26-22: A conviction rate the office says does not exist, priced at $9,548 (Denied — record does not exist; $9,548 quote for the underlying files, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 26-21 — FOIA 26-21: A count of convictions the office says does not exist — then a quiet amendment that changed the number behind the bill (Denied as a compilation — no count produced; fee of $9,548.00 quoted for underlying files; amended response revised the volume figure without explanation, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 26-20 — FOIA 26-20: The aggregate case total, and the records that would let you count it (Denied — record does not exist, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 25-279 — FOIA 25-279: The office granted the personnel and budget records on paper — then sent three invoices totaling $34,673.79 and none of the records (Granted in part on paper — dozens of records listed as enclosed and none enclosed; three cost itemizations totaling $34,673.79, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-278 — FOIA 25-278: The office says it never tracked plea bargaining — then bills $23,146.66 for a 4,000-file review it says is already covered by another invoice (Granted in part — 62 trials produced from the calendar; plea-offer data certified not to exist; a $23,146.66 estimate the office says is moot if the twin invoice is paid, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-277 — FOIA 25-277: No annual statistical report exists, the underlying data does, and the office prices it at $34,720 (Granted in part — no statistical report exists; the underlying data is granted at a $34,720 estimate built on a volume figure the office has never counted, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-257 — FOIA 25-257: Three certificates of nonexistence, then a $19,840 bill to rebuild the data by hand (Denied — three certificates of nonexistence, with a $19,840 estimate to rebuild the same data by hand, October 31, 2025)
• FOIA 25-254 — FOIA 25-254: Two certificates of nonexistence, two documents produced, and a $74,520 itemization copied from an earlier request (Granted in part, denied in part — two documents produced, two certificates of nonexistence, and a $74,520 estimate identical to FOIA 25-244's, October 31, 2025)
• FOIA 25-244 — FOIA 25-244: Ten service slips, thirteen policy manuals, and a $74,520 quote (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-241 — FOIA 25-241: The special-prosecutor petition the office filed, and the 2024 memo that says it did not need another one (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-240 — FOIA 25-240: Officer use-of-force referrals, and the $1,863 bill for the one part the office would search (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-239 — FOIA 25-239: The Brady/Giglio list and how the office tracks officer credibility (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-234 — FOIA 25-234: Four lab reports, two certificates, and 26.4 grams where the press said four ounces (Granted in part, October 1, 2025)
• FOIA 25-202 — FOIA 25-202: No RFP, no bid, no purchase order — and the emails that show how the system was picked (Granted in part, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-201 — FOIA 25-201: ProsecutorByKarpel contracts, invoices, and licensing (Granted in part, denied in part, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-200 — FOIA 25-200: The software the office runs on — seven systems named, one of them retired in June 2024 (Granted in full, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-197 — FOIA 25-197: A request for complaints against the office came back as the office's own civil-rights lawsuits (Granted in part, denied in part, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-196 — FOIA 25-196: Audits of the office, 2019 through 2024 — five county financial statements produced, two fiscal years missing (Granted in part — five annual county financial statements produced; fiscal years 2022 and 2024 absent from the release; no exemption cited and no certificate of nonexistence, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-195 — FOIA 25-195: Reports on the office's own work — four case-tracking reports produced, performance reviews certified nonexistent, county reports withheld as attorney-client (Granted in part and denied in part — ten documents produced; county reports withheld on attorney-client privilege; performance reviews certified nonexistent; $5,961.60 estimated, $2,980.80 deposit, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-194 — FOIA 25-194: Every email and text the Prosecutor sent in 2024 — a $63,028.80 estimate on a request the requester offered to narrow (Granted in part and denied in part — exemptions cited; $63,028.80 estimated, $31,514.40 deposit required, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-215 — FOIA 25-215: Three answers to one request — two certificates of nonexistence, a grant, and a $13,248 estimate (Granted in part, August 9, 2025)
• FOIA 25-180 — FOIA 25-180: Two boxes checked — the trial records both “already provided” and “do not exist” (Denied in full — certificate of nonexistence plus an exemption box checked; no fee, no pages produced, August 2, 2025)
• FOIA 25-139 — FOIA 25-139: Forfeitures in cases that ended without a conviction, certified not to exist — while the same office took an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-137 — FOIA 25-137: The average time from charge to disposition, certified not to exist — after a ten-day extension for “voluminous” records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-136 — FOIA 25-136: The plea-agreement count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-135 — FOIA 25-135: The office denied the 2024 trial summary as a record that “does not exist” — then produced eight case files on the next page (Granted in part — 8 case files produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-134 — FOIA 25-134: The dismissed-case count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-133 — FOIA 25-133: The office certified the monthly count did not exist — then attached an annual one and offered to sell the underlying data for $2,815.20 (Granted in part — one annual screening table produced; monthly counts withheld; $2,815.20 quoted with a $1,407.60 deposit, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-129 — FOIA 25-129: Arraignment-to-disposition times the office certified do not exist, then priced at $2,931.12 (Granted in part — two items denied as nonexistent; $2,931.12 quote on the third, June 26, 2025)
• FOIA 25-118 — FOIA 25-118: Final case outcomes for January and February 2025 (Fee estimate issued, June 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-94 — Prosecutor Case Outcome Statistics, 2021–2025 (Granted in Part, May 23, 2025)