FOIA 25-240: Officer use-of-force referrals, and the $1,863 bill for the one part the office would search

Watchdog Alerts

Why isn’t this basic information available to the public?

1. The requester asked, in the request letter itself, that all fees be waived under the public-interest provision of MCL 15.234(1). The county's own Detailed Cost Itemization has a 'Waiver: Public Interest' section with two boxes, 'All fees are waived' and 'All fees are reduced by.' Both are blank. Was the waiver considered at all?
2. The office certifies that it keeps no written policies, procedures, or training materials for evaluating officer-involved use of force. In the same October 30 letter it produces twelve written Brady/Giglio disclosure-policy documents. Why does the office have written standards for one prosecutorial decision and none for the other?
3. Part one says the office keeps no log or summary of use-of-force referrals. Yet the same letter says it can identify 'approximately 50 cases per year, for 6 years, or approximately 300 files.' How does the office find those files without an index of them?
4. The request expressly asked for 'the total number of pages withheld or redacted.' The response describes the categories of separated material but gives no page count for any part. Where is the count the statute's disclosure provisions were meant to enable?
5. The office priced the one granted category at $1,863.00 and required $931.50 before it would begin the search. It did not offer a narrowed alternative or a less expensive way to reach the same records. What would it have cost to search a narrower date range or a single referring agency?
6. The county's own cost itemization and denial form record the request as received 10/10/2025, the day of the fax. The cover letter says it was received 10/13/2025. Which date does the office use to compute its deadlines, and why do its own documents disagree?

Timing caveat. ProsecutorByKarpel went live in June 2024. This page does not use the case-management system to judge the office's handling of incidents before go-live; it uses the record only where the record concerns the period after go-live, including the 2024–2025 referrals the request was meant to reach.

On October 10, 2025, at 8:50 in the morning, a requester faxed the Delta County Prosecutor's Office a four-part request for records on how the office handles law enforcement misconduct, use-of-force incidents, and officer-involved shootings. It was one of seven requests the office logged that day under numbers 25-239 through 25-245. On October 30, 2025, FOIA Coordinator Emily Desalvo answered all seven in a single letter. For 25-240 the office denied three of the four parts outright, certifying that the records do not exist, and granted the fourth only on condition of a $1,863.00 fee and a $931.50 deposit. The requester had asked, in the same letter, that all fees be waived under the public-interest provision of the Freedom of Information Act. The county's own fee form leaves the waiver section blank.

That combination — a detailed, arithmetically consistent seven-page cost estimate attached to a request whose fee-waiver paragraph is never answered — is the reason this file belongs in the archive. The office did not refuse to search. It priced the search, itemized it line by line, and set a deposit. What it did not do is tell the requester why the public-interest waiver he invoked was denied, or grant it. Under the county's form, that decision is recorded by checking one of two boxes. Neither box is checked.

This page reads the 25-240 portion of the October 30 packet page by page: the request, the extension, the four determinations, the Notice of Denial, the detailed cost itemization, and the two appeal forms the office enclosed. It separates what the office produced from what it said it would produce, and it keeps the arithmetic honest — the estimate adds up, and saying so is part of reading the record fairly. The other six requests answered by the same letter are not analyzed here; they will be added when their documents are submitted.

Summary

FOIA 25-240 asked for four categories of record. First, logs, summaries, or referral forms documenting all use-of-force or officer-involved incidents submitted to the office for review or charging from January 1, 2020 to the present, including referrals from the Delta County Sheriff's Office, the Escanaba Police Department, the Gladstone Police Department, and the Michigan State Police. Second, prosecutor review memos, declination summaries, or case-closing statements for those referrals where no charges were issued against the involved officers. Third, any written policies, procedures, or training materials the office uses to evaluate officer-involved use-of-force incidents or to decide whether to authorize charges. Fourth, correspondence between the office and any law enforcement agency, MCOLES, or the Michigan Attorney General's Office discussing officer misconduct referrals, use-of-force reviews, or declination decisions.

The office answered each part separately. On part one it granted in part and denied in part. It denied the request as to logs and summaries, and as to any referral forms concerning law enforcement misconduct, use-of-force incidents in which an officer is named as the suspect, and officer-involved shootings, certifying that those records do not exist. It granted the request as to use-of-force or officer-involved incidents where a police officer is not named as the suspect, subject to the fee estimate. On part two it denied the request and certified that review memos, declination summaries, and case-closing statements do not exist. On part three it denied the request and certified that no written policies, procedures, or training materials for evaluating officer-involved use-of-force exist. On part four it denied the request and certified that no correspondence with law enforcement, MCOLES, or the Attorney General on these subjects exists.

Read together, the four answers describe an office that will search for the underlying incident files but says it keeps no index of them, writes no review memo when it declines charges, maintains no written standard for evaluating force, and holds no correspondence with the agencies that refer such cases. The one category it will produce — incidents in which an officer used force but was not the person against whom charges were sought — is real and substantial, roughly 300 files over six years by the office's own estimate. It is also not the category the request was captioned to reach. The request was titled “Prosecutor Review of Law Enforcement Misconduct and Use-of-Force Referrals.” The misconduct half is denied as nonexistent. The use-of-force half is granted only for the cases in which the officer is not the suspect.

What was requested

The request is dated October 10, 2025 and was transmitted by fax. The Zimbra fax receipt records delivery at 10.10.2025 08:50:02 −04:00, one page, 38 KB, to the county's administrative fax line at 906-789-5197. The request was captioned “FOIA Request — Prosecutor Review of Law Enforcement Misconduct and Use-of-Force Referrals,” and it asked for:

“1. Logs, summaries, or referral forms documenting all use-of-force or officer-involved incidents submitted to the Prosecutor's Office for review or charging determination from January 1, 2020 to present, including but not limited to referrals from the Delta County Sheriff's Office, Escanaba Police Department, Gladstone Police Department, and Michigan State Police.

2. Prosecutor review memos, declination summaries, or case-closing statements for such referrals where no criminal charges were issued against the involved officer(s).

3. Any written policies, procedures, or training materials used by the Prosecutor's Office to evaluate officer-involved use-of-force incidents or determine whether to authorize criminal charges.

4. Correspondence (letters or emails) between the Prosecutor's Office and any law enforcement agency, MCOLES, or Michigan Attorney General's Office discussing officer misconduct referrals, use-of-force reviews, or declination decisions.”

Four procedural provisions followed, and each matters to how the response should be read. The request limited itself to “finalized or closed records” and expressly disclaimed “ongoing investigative files, grand jury materials, or privileged communications.” It asked the office to “redact only the specific portions exempt under MCL 15.243, and release the remainder as required by MCL 15.244(1).” It asked that any claimed exemption identify “the specific statutory subsection relied upon,” describe “the nature of the withheld material,” and state “the total number of pages withheld or redacted.” It asked for the records electronically, by email, in PDF. And it asked that all fees be waived:

“Please waive all fees pursuant to MCL 15.234(1), as disclosure of these records serves the significant public interest of evaluating prosecutorial oversight and transparency in law enforcement accountability.”

It closed by asking for a response within five business days under MCL 15.235(2), or a written notice of a ten-day extension if one was needed.

There is a receipt-date discrepancy of the same kind recorded on FOIA 25-239. The fax landed on Friday, October 10, 2025, and the county's own forms confirm it: the Detailed Cost Itemization records “Date Request Received: 10/10/2025,” and the Notice of Denial records “Date Received 10/10/2025.” But the October 30 cover letter states that the requests were “dated October 10, 2025, received October 13, 2025.” October 13 was the following Monday. The office counts its deadlines from Monday, which moves every downstream date by one business day. On this file the difference does not change the outcome — the response was timely on either date — but the two records disagree, and the disagreement is documented.

The paper trail

Figure 1 · One request, one extension, one answer, one bill

Select any date to read what happened and which clock it started or stopped.

Oct 10, 2025 Request faxed Oct 13, 2025 Received Oct 16, 2025 Extension filed Oct 20, 2025 Five-day deadline Oct 30, 2025 Response issued Nov 3, 2025 Extended deadline After deposit Production estimate

October 10–16, 2025 — the request arrives, and the clock is started twice

Documented: The fax receipt is unambiguous: the transmission landed on October 10, 2025 at 08:50:02 Eastern, one page, 38 KB. The county's own cost itemization and denial form both record the date received as 10/10/2025. But the cover letter signed on October 30 states the requests were “received October 13, 2025.” That is a three-day gap, and it is the difference between a Friday and the following Monday. The same pattern appears on 25-239, where the fax receipt reads 06:13:14 on October 10 and the letter again counts from October 13.

The agency's position: The office filed its Notice to Extend Response Time on October 16, 2025, six calendar days after the fax and three days after the receipt date it acknowledges. The form is dated, signed by the FOIA Coordinator, and checks the “voluminous amount of separate and distinct public records” reason. Under MCL 15.235(2)(d), a public body that needs more than five business days must give written notice within those five days, state the reason, and set a date by which it will respond. The office did all three. The extension was proper on its face.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: Whether the office counts from Friday or Monday, the extension was filed inside the five-day window and the response was issued inside the extended window. The receipt-date discrepancy does not produce a late response here. It is recorded because it recurs across the October 10 batch, and because a requester tracking deadlines from the fax timestamp would compute a different date than the office does.

October 30, 2025 — four determinations in one letter

Documented: The October 30 letter answers the four parts in order. Part one is “GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.” Parts two, three and four are each “DENIED,” and each denial carries the same certificate: that after a search, and to the best of the undersigned's knowledge and belief, the records “do not exist within the records of the public body under the name nor any other name reasonably known to the public body.” The letter is signed by Emily DeSalvo, FOIA Coordinator, and encloses a Notice of Denial, the cost itemization, a denial appeal form, and a fee appeal form.

The agency's position: On part one, the office separates the request into three pieces. It denies the request as to logs and summaries, certifying they do not exist. It denies the request as to “any referral forms concerning law enforcement misconduct, use-of-force incidents [naming officer as suspect], and officer-involved shootings,” again certifying they do not exist. It grants the request as to “all use-of-force or officer-involved incidents where a police officer is NOT named as the suspect,” subject to the fee. The grant is therefore real but narrower than the request's caption: it reaches incidents in which an officer used force but was not the person against whom charges were sought, and it does not reach the officer-misconduct category at all.

Documented: The office explains why the granted category is expensive to search. It says a file can involve a use-of-force incident without the charge name revealing it, because charges such as “Police Officer Assaulting/Resisting/Obstructing, Flee & Elude, or Assault of a Prison Employee” may or may not have involved force. It therefore proposes to review every file carrying those charges to determine whether force was used. That review, it says, will require “approximately 50 cases per year, for 6 years, or approximately 300 files.”

October 30, 2025 — the bill

Documented: The seven-page Detailed Cost Itemization is prepared for Request No. 25-240 and dated 10/30/2025. It charges two labor lines and nothing else. The hourly rate is stated as $24.82 with fringe benefit cost, which the form converts to $6.21 per fifteen-minute increment. Labor to locate is 3,000 minutes, or 200 fifteen-minute increments, at $6.21, for $1,242.00. Labor to separate exempt from nonexempt material is 1,500 minutes, or 100 increments, at $6.21, for $621.00. Copying, contract labor, duplication and mailing are all zero. The subtotal is $1,863.00, and the good-faith deposit is 50 percent, or $931.50.

Documented: The arithmetic on the form is internally consistent. Two hundred increments at $6.21 is $1,242.00; one hundred increments at $6.21 is $621.00; the sum is $1,863.00; half is $931.50. The 3,000 and 1,500 minutes correspond to 300 files at ten and five minutes each. Whatever one thinks of the estimate's size, it is not a loose number: it is built from a stated file count, a stated per-file time, a stated increment, and a stated rate, and the multiplication is correct.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: MCL 15.234(1) permits a public body to charge for the labor of searching, locating and examining records, and for separating exempt from nonexempt material, but caps that labor at the hourly wage of the lowest-paid employee capable of performing the task, and permits fringe benefits to be added up to 50 percent of that wage. The form states a rate of $24.82 with fringe and converts it to $6.21 per quarter hour. Whether that rate equals the lowest-paid capable employee's wage is not something this record establishes; the form asserts the rate but does not show the underlying wage. The statute also permits a good-faith deposit of up to half the estimate when the estimate exceeds $50, which is what the office required.

The waiver request and the blank boxes

Documented: The request letter contains an express fee-waiver paragraph. It asks the office to “waive all fees pursuant to MCL 15.234(1), as disclosure of these records serves the significant public interest of evaluating prosecutorial oversight and transparency in law enforcement accountability.” The county's Detailed Cost Itemization contains a section headed “Waiver: Public Interest.” It recites the statutory standard — that a search or copies may be furnished without charge or at a reduced charge if the county determines a waiver is in the public interest because the request primarily benefits the general public — and offers two boxes: “All fees are waived” and “All fees are reduced by” a stated percentage. Both boxes are blank. The subtotal before waiver, $1,863.00, carries forward unchanged to the deposit line. No separate written determination of the waiver request appears anywhere in the 47-page packet.

The agency's position: The office imposed the full estimate and required the full 50 percent deposit. It did not state, in the letter or on the form, that the waiver was denied, or why.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: MCL 15.234(1) makes a public-interest waiver discretionary: a public body “may” furnish records without charge if it determines the request primarily benefits the general public. The statute does not, on its face, require a written explanation every time a waiver is declined. But a requester who invokes the provision and receives a bill has no way to know from this packet whether the waiver was considered and rejected or simply not addressed. The county's own form provides the mechanism for recording that decision — the two boxes — and the mechanism was left unused. That is a documentation gap the record supports, not an assertion that the fee was unlawful.

Open question: Was the public-interest waiver under MCL 15.234(1) evaluated at all, and if it was declined, on what reasoning? The packet does not say.

What the office says does not exist

Documented: Three of the four parts are denied in full on a certificate of nonexistence, and part one is denied in part on the same basis. The Notice of Denial dated 10/30/2025 checks the “Part of your request for records has been denied” box, the “Record Does Not Exist” box, the “Exempt from Disclosure” box and the “Redaction” box. It lists the exemption subsections relied on — MCL 15.243(1)(a), (1)(b)(iii), (1)(d) under the Crime Victim's Rights Act at MCL 780.758, and (1)(w) — and describes the separated material as “names, addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, social security numbers, criminal identification numbers, information related to crime victim rights.”

Documented: The redaction provisions the office cites are real provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. MCL 15.243(1)(a) covers information of a personal nature whose disclosure would be a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy; MCL 15.243(1)(b)(iii) covers law-enforcement investigation records whose disclosure would be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; MCL 15.243(1)(d) covers records made confidential by statute, here the Crime Victim's Rights Act; and MCL 15.243(1)(w) covers records that would disclose a Social Security number. This is a material difference from 25-239, where the same office cited “MCL 15.234(1)(s)(ix),” a subsection that does not exist. On 25-240 the citations resolve to actual law.

Documented: The request expressly asked the office to state “the total number of pages withheld or redacted.” The response gives no page count for any part. The Notice of Denial describes the categories of separated material but not the volume. Because no records were produced with the October 30 letter — production is contingent on the deposit — there is also no redacted production yet to which a page count could attach.

The agency's position: The office treated the nonexistence certificates as complete answers to parts two, three and four. It did not offer a narrowed alternative for those parts, or identify a different record that might contain the same information.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: A certificate of nonexistence is a recognized answer under the Act when a public body, after a reasonable search, concludes the record does not exist. The Act does not require a public body to create a record it does not keep. The questions this record raises are therefore not about whether the office may say “does not exist,” but about what the four certificates, taken together, describe: an office that reviews officer use-of-force cases but says it keeps no log of them, writes no memo when it declines charges, holds no written standard for the review, and has no correspondence with the referring agencies about it.

The gap between part three and the rest of the packet

Documented: Part three asked for any written policies, procedures, or training materials used to evaluate officer-involved use-of-force incidents or to decide whether to authorize charges. The office denied it, certifying that no such records exist. In the same October 30 letter, in the section answering 25-239, the office granted a different category of written policy material: twelve documents on Brady and Giglio disclosure obligations, including the office's own reference set dated August 22, 2023 and April 1, 2025, a “Brady & Giglio: A Prosecutor's Guide” from the Prosecuting Attorneys Coordinating Council, and the Michigan Prosecutors' Justice Initiative Best Practice Recommendations approved in 2023.

Documented: Those are disclosure policies, not use-of-force policies. The office can lawfully maintain written guidance on one class of prosecutorial decision and none on another. The record does not show that the part-three certificate is wrong. What it shows is an asymmetry: the office keeps, and readily produces, written reference material on how to disclose impeachment information to defendants, while certifying that it keeps no written material on how to evaluate an officer's use of force. Both statements can be true at once. Read side by side, they describe where the office has invested in written standards and where it has not.

Open question: If the office has no written standard for evaluating officer-involved force, what standard does it apply, and is that standard recorded anywhere a requester could obtain it?

The pattern this file fits

Documented: 25-240 is the second of the seven October 10 requests to be added to this archive, after 25-239. The two files share a request date, a fax transmission, a single combined response letter, a dated extension, and a timely answer. They differ sharply in what the office produced. On 25-239 the office produced 137 pages at no charge and described a case-by-case practice for tracking officer credibility. On 25-240 the office produced no records, certified three of four parts nonexistent, and priced the fourth at $1,863.00 with a $931.50 deposit. Same office, same day, same letter — two very different postures toward disclosure.

Documented: The fee posture also differs from the rest of the archive. On 25-239 the office quoted nothing. On 26-22 it quoted $9,548. On 25-240 it quotes $1,863 and demands $931.50 before it will begin the search. The common thread across the priced files is that the office attaches a detailed itemization to a request it says it can answer, and the requester must decide whether to pay before seeing whether the records are worth the price.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: Nothing in the Act forbids charging a properly itemized fee, and nothing forbids requiring a good-faith deposit on a large estimate. The Act does require that the itemization be furnished before payment is required, and the office did that. What the Act leaves to the public body's judgment is the public-interest waiver, and that is the judgment this file leaves undocumented.

Authorities and sources

Show the statutes, cases, and sources cited on this page

• MCL 15.231 et seq. — Michigan Freedom of Information Act.
• MCL 15.233 — procedure for requesting public records; written request and response obligations.
• MCL 15.234 — fees, labor charges, fringe benefits, good-faith deposits, and the public-interest waiver and reduction provision at subsection (1).
• MCL 15.235 — response timing: five business days, and the single ten-business-day extension under subsection (2)(d).
• MCL 15.240 — appeal of a denial to the county board or judicial review in circuit court.
• MCL 15.240a — appeal of an excess fee, added by 2014 PA 563, effective July 1, 2015.
• MCL 15.243(1)(a), (1)(b)(iii), (1)(d), (1)(w) — the exemptions cited in the Notice of Denial.
• MCL 15.244(1) — segregation of exempt from nonexempt material and release of the remainder.
• MCL 780.758 — Crime Victim's Rights Act, the statute underlying the (1)(d) citation.
• Delta County FOIA Detailed Cost Itemization Form — prepared for Request No. 25-240, dated 10/30/2025, seven pages.
• Delta County Notice of Denial — Request No. 25-240, dated 10/30/2025.
• Delta County Notice to Extend Response Time — Request No. 25-240, dated 10-16-25.
• Delta County Fee Appeal Form and Denial Appeal Form — enclosed with the response, pre-filled with Request No. 25-240.

Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here

Legal interpretation: The central legal questions on this page are narrow. First, whether the public-interest waiver under MCL 15.234(1) was considered, and how a requester is meant to know if it was not. Second, whether a certificate of nonexistence for written use-of-force policies is consistent with the office's production of written disclosure policies in the same letter. Third, whether the absence of a page count for withheld material, despite an express request for one, leaves the requester unable to evaluate the redactions. None of these questions requires a finding that the office violated the Act. Each is a question the released record raises and does not answer.

What would change this picture

Four records, if produced, would resolve most of the open questions on this page. First, any written determination of the MCL 15.234(1) waiver request, whether granting or denying it. Second, the office's written standard, if one exists outside the records searched, for evaluating officer-involved use of force — or a description of the unwritten standard it applies. Third, a page count and item-level description of any material redacted from the 300-file production, once that production occurs. Fourth, the record of how the office identifies its roughly 50 use-of-force cases per year if, as it says, it keeps no log of them.

None of these requires a new legal theory. They are specific documents with specific descriptions, and a narrowed follow-up request naming them directly would test the office's answers without arguing about characterization.

Open questions

• Was the public-interest fee waiver under MCL 15.234(1) evaluated, and if it was declined, on what reasoning? The itemization's waiver boxes are blank and no determination appears in the packet.
• Why does the office certify that no written policies, procedures, or training materials for evaluating officer-involved force exist, while producing twelve written disclosure-policy documents in the same letter?
• How does the office identify approximately 50 use-of-force cases per year for six years if, as part one states, it keeps no log or summary of them?
• What is the total number of pages withheld or redacted, which the request expressly asked for and the response does not state?
• Was the $931.50 deposit paid, and if so, when did the 90-day production clock start?
• Why do the county's own forms record the request as received 10/10/2025 while the cover letter records 10/13/2025?
• Was any narrowing option or less-expensive alternative offered before the $1,863 estimate was set?

Documents

These are redacted copies prepared for publication. Requester names, home addresses, personal phone numbers, and email addresses have been removed. Unredacted originals are not hosted on the public web server.

Related FOIA requests

• FOIA 26-292 — FOIA 26-292: The office used the requester's own cost-saving clause to withdraw the request, then offered to grant it if he removed the clause (Granted in part, denied in part — no records produced; the office conceded the data exists and refused the aggregate on the ground that the requester's own scope limitation excluded it, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-291 — FOIA 26-291: The office answered a request for a privilege log with nine document titles — and cited a subsection of the FOIA that does not exist (Granted in part — a nine-row title-and-date table supplying two of the eleven requested fields, no count, and a citation to a subsection of MCL 15.243 that does not exist, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-290 — FOIA 26-290: The office refused the victim-services records because it says you already have them — from a packet that contained none (Refused — five paragraphs labelled “granted” but zero pages produced, on the authority of a prior production that contained no responsive documents; the sixth paragraph received no disposition, October 25, 2026)
• FOIA 26-131 — FOIA 26-131: Twenty case files, priced at $82.66 before a single page is copied (Granted in part — release conditioned on a $41.33 deposit; no records produced yet, April 17, 2026)
• FOIA 26-35 — FOIA 26-35: The office counted 52 pleas in 85 minutes — eight days after saying the same kind of aggregate did not exist (Granted — 52 pleas reported from the District and Circuit Court dockets, no fee quoted, no exemption cited, no pages withheld; the count is over-inclusive by the office's own admission, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-34 — FOIA 26-34: The office denied a count of diversion cases by defining “diversion” down to a programme it does not run (Denied — certificate of nonexistence under MCL 15.233(1), Denial Form box 2 checked, on the ground that the only diversion programme in Delta County is juvenile diversion administered by the Probate Court; no exemption cited, no fee quoted, no waiver determination, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-33 — FOIA 26-33: Asked to count deferred prosecution agreements, the office certified the total nonexistent and priced the underlying data at $9,093.33 (Granted in part and denied in part — the aggregate record denied as requiring creation of a new record, with a certificate of nonexistence and Denial Form box 2 checked; the underlying data granted subject to a $9,093.33 estimate, a $4,546.66 deposit and a 270-day production estimate; public-interest fee waiver left undetermined, February 9, 2026)
• FOIA 26-32 — FOIA 26-32: What the office's own memos say about the migration that broke its records — a 95-page production that answers its own denial (Granted in part, denied in part — five records produced across 95 pages, with only personal contact information redacted under MCL 15.243(1)(a); no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-31 — FOIA 26-31: Asked how many crime scenes a prosecutor attended, the office listed eight documents and denied them as duplicative (Denied in full — refused as a duplicative request under Densmore v Department of Corrections, on the ground that the eight listed records were already produced in response to FOIA 25-267; Denial Form box 1 checked with the section 13 subsection left blank; no aggregate figure supplied and no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-30 — FOIA 26-30: Eight documents, one number, and a Densmore refusal built on a premise the record does not fully support (Denied — no aggregate total produced; eight responsive documents identified but not reproduced under a Densmore prior-production rationale; no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
• FOIA 26-29 — FOIA 26-29: A count of inherited convictions the office could not locate — priced at $1,033.33 for the work of counting (No count produced — office could not locate a record; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,033.33 with a $516.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
• FOIA 26-28 — FOIA 26-28: A headcount of cases open when the prosecutor took office — denied, then priced at $1,653.33 on an 800-file baseline (Denied in part, granted in part — no record states the headcount, with a certificate of nonexistence; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,653.33 with an $826.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
• FOIA 26-22 — FOIA 26-22: A conviction rate the office says does not exist, priced at $9,548 (Denied — record does not exist; $9,548 quote for the underlying files, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 26-21 — FOIA 26-21: A count of convictions the office says does not exist — then a quiet amendment that changed the number behind the bill (Denied as a compilation — no count produced; fee of $9,548.00 quoted for underlying files; amended response revised the volume figure without explanation, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 26-20 — FOIA 26-20: The aggregate case total, and the records that would let you count it (Denied — record does not exist, January 30, 2026)
• FOIA 25-279 — FOIA 25-279: The office granted the personnel and budget records on paper — then sent three invoices totaling $34,673.79 and none of the records (Granted in part on paper — dozens of records listed as enclosed and none enclosed; three cost itemizations totaling $34,673.79, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-278 — FOIA 25-278: The office says it never tracked plea bargaining — then bills $23,146.66 for a 4,000-file review it says is already covered by another invoice (Granted in part — 62 trials produced from the calendar; plea-offer data certified not to exist; a $23,146.66 estimate the office says is moot if the twin invoice is paid, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-277 — FOIA 25-277: No annual statistical report exists, the underlying data does, and the office prices it at $34,720 (Granted in part — no statistical report exists; the underlying data is granted at a $34,720 estimate built on a volume figure the office has never counted, November 25, 2025)
• FOIA 25-257 — FOIA 25-257: Three certificates of nonexistence, then a $19,840 bill to rebuild the data by hand (Denied — three certificates of nonexistence, with a $19,840 estimate to rebuild the same data by hand, October 31, 2025)
• FOIA 25-254 — FOIA 25-254: Two certificates of nonexistence, two documents produced, and a $74,520 itemization copied from an earlier request (Granted in part, denied in part — two documents produced, two certificates of nonexistence, and a $74,520 estimate identical to FOIA 25-244's, October 31, 2025)
• FOIA 25-244 — FOIA 25-244: Ten service slips, thirteen policy manuals, and a $74,520 quote (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-241 — FOIA 25-241: The special-prosecutor petition the office filed, and the 2024 memo that says it did not need another one (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-239 — FOIA 25-239: The Brady/Giglio list and how the office tracks officer credibility (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
• FOIA 25-234 — FOIA 25-234: Four lab reports, two certificates, and 26.4 grams where the press said four ounces (Granted in part, October 1, 2025)
• FOIA 25-202 — FOIA 25-202: No RFP, no bid, no purchase order — and the emails that show how the system was picked (Granted in part, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-201 — FOIA 25-201: ProsecutorByKarpel contracts, invoices, and licensing (Granted in part, denied in part, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-200 — FOIA 25-200: The software the office runs on — seven systems named, one of them retired in June 2024 (Granted in full, August 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-197 — FOIA 25-197: A request for complaints against the office came back as the office's own civil-rights lawsuits (Granted in part, denied in part, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-196 — FOIA 25-196: Audits of the office, 2019 through 2024 — five county financial statements produced, two fiscal years missing (Granted in part — five annual county financial statements produced; fiscal years 2022 and 2024 absent from the release; no exemption cited and no certificate of nonexistence, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-195 — FOIA 25-195: Reports on the office's own work — four case-tracking reports produced, performance reviews certified nonexistent, county reports withheld as attorney-client (Granted in part and denied in part — ten documents produced; county reports withheld on attorney-client privilege; performance reviews certified nonexistent; $5,961.60 estimated, $2,980.80 deposit, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-194 — FOIA 25-194: Every email and text the Prosecutor sent in 2024 — a $63,028.80 estimate on a request the requester offered to narrow (Granted in part and denied in part — exemptions cited; $63,028.80 estimated, $31,514.40 deposit required, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
• FOIA 25-215 — FOIA 25-215: Three answers to one request — two certificates of nonexistence, a grant, and a $13,248 estimate (Granted in part, August 9, 2025)
• FOIA 25-180 — FOIA 25-180: Two boxes checked — the trial records both “already provided” and “do not exist” (Denied in full — certificate of nonexistence plus an exemption box checked; no fee, no pages produced, August 2, 2025)
• FOIA 25-139 — FOIA 25-139: Forfeitures in cases that ended without a conviction, certified not to exist — while the same office took an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-137 — FOIA 25-137: The average time from charge to disposition, certified not to exist — after a ten-day extension for “voluminous” records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-136 — FOIA 25-136: The plea-agreement count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-135 — FOIA 25-135: The office denied the 2024 trial summary as a record that “does not exist” — then produced eight case files on the next page (Granted in part — 8 case files produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-134 — FOIA 25-134: The dismissed-case count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-133 — FOIA 25-133: The office certified the monthly count did not exist — then attached an annual one and offered to sell the underlying data for $2,815.20 (Granted in part — one annual screening table produced; monthly counts withheld; $2,815.20 quoted with a $1,407.60 deposit, June 27, 2025)
• FOIA 25-129 — FOIA 25-129: Arraignment-to-disposition times the office certified do not exist, then priced at $2,931.12 (Granted in part — two items denied as nonexistent; $2,931.12 quote on the third, June 26, 2025)
• FOIA 25-118 — FOIA 25-118: Final case outcomes for January and February 2025 (Fee estimate issued, June 18, 2025)
• FOIA 25-94 — Prosecutor Case Outcome Statistics, 2021–2025 (Granted in Part, May 23, 2025)