Watchdog Alerts
Why isn’t this basic information available to the public?
- The office issued two invoices the same day, to the same requester, for what its own footnote says is one review. FOIA 25-277 is $34,720.00; FOIA 25-278 is $23,146.66. Together, $57,866.66, with $28,933.33 in deposits. On every line of the 25-278 itemization the office concedes that paying the 25-277 estimate 'would capture' these documents and make this estimate 'moot' — and billed for both anyway.
- The office certified that it keeps no record of how many plea offers it makes, no record of how many cases resolve by plea, and no acceptance or rejection rates — then conceded in the same letter that 'the underlying data that would allow for the number to be derived is available and in the possession of the Prosecutor's Office.'
- The one substantive production — 62 trials across four years — the office obtained by reading 'the internal calendar,' not by reviewing 4,000 files. Yet the itemization prices a 4,000-file review at $23,146.66. The review that was billed is not the review that was performed.
- The office's own paragraph explains that 'the old case tracking system did not have data fields related to the tracking of plea-bargaining or Brady/Giglio,' and that plea detail is still not entered into ProsecutorByKarpel. The absence of plea data is a records-management choice, not a search result — and it is buried under a certificate of nonexistence.
- The 'approximately 1000 cases/year' premise behind the invoice has now appeared in six responses in this archive — 25-215, 25-244, 25-254, 26-22, 25-277 and 25-278 — without ever being derived from a count, a query output or a docket total.
- The Public Interest fee waiver section on the itemization is blank — for the second time in one day, for the same requester — and the packet omits the Fee Appeal Form and the text of MCL 15.240a.
Timing caveat. ProsecutorByKarpel went live in June 2024, and this request covers January 1, 2022 to the present, so roughly two and a half years of the window predate the system. Nothing on this page faults the office for how those earlier years were kept. The office's own paragraph is narrower and more useful: it says the old system never had a field for plea bargaining, so there was nothing to migrate, and that staff still do not enter plea detail into ProsecutorByKarpel. The absence of plea-offer data therefore runs continuously across the before and the after. That is a records-management fact the office volunteered, and it is the honest answer to a request the formal certificate answered with the word 'none.'
On November 25, 2025, a request went to the Delta County Prosecutor’s Office asking how the office plea bargains: how many plea offers it makes, how many cases resolve by plea, how many go to trial, what sentencing ranges it offers, what written policies govern the offers, and what performance metrics it keeps. It was faxed at 6:01:58 that evening, four pages, logged as received on November 26, and answered on December 18, 2025 — the same day, by the same coordinator, on the same form, as FOIA 25-277.
The answer is a document that grants almost nothing and admits almost everything. The office certified that it keeps no record of how many plea offers it makes, no record of how many cases resolve by plea, no record of acceptance or rejection rates, no policies, no metrics and no reports. It produced two blank forms and one number. The number is the count of cases that went to trial: 62 across 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025. The office got that number, it says, by reading “the internal calendar.” It did not get it by reviewing 4,000 files.
Then it billed for 4,000 files anyway. The itemization prices a review of “approximately 1000 cases/year (4 YEARS requested)” at $23,146.66, with an $11,573.33 deposit and a 180-day estimate. And on every one of its sixteen lines, a footnote concedes the point that makes the invoice strange: if the requester pays the estimate already issued for FOIA 25-277, “the documents in this request would be captured in that review, making this estimate moot.”
This page separates five things. First, what was asked and how the office answered each of the six numbered items. Second, the one thing it actually produced — a four-year trial count — and what that count does to the premise underneath the invoice. Third, the invoice itself, which this time is arithmetically correct, and which the office’s own footnote says is redundant with another invoice issued the same day. Fourth, the paragraph the office volunteered about its records migration, which is the most candid thing in the packet and which contradicts the formal certificate sitting above it. Fifth, the opinion, which is that 25-278 is the twin of 25-277, and that the twin billing is the finding.
Where the record supports criticism, the criticism is made and the document is cited. Where the record is silent, this page says so. The office’s letter is quoted at length because its own words carry the argument better than a summary would. Redacted copies of the response letter, the denial and appeal forms, the fee itemization with the extension notice, the request with its fax receipt, and the responsive forms are linked under Documents below.
Summary
The request had six numbered items in three groups, plus an unnumbered note. Group A asked for plea offer data and tracking: any database, log or report tracking the number of plea offers made, the number resolved by plea, the number proceeding to trial, and acceptance or rejection rates; and any export or data field from the case-management system showing plea offer details, charges before and after the offer, sentencing ranges offered, and the final plea outcome. Group B asked for sentencing ranges, offers and policies: written policies, manuals, SOPs, memoranda, checklists or training on standardized offers, sentencing ranges, enhancement and reduction guidelines, and mandatory minimums; and templates or form letters for plea offers or withdrawal notices. Group C asked for internal analytics and performance metrics: KPI reports on plea resolution rates, prosecutor performance, trial-to-plea ratios and timeliness; and statistical reports sent to external agencies such as the Michigan Prosecuting Attorneys Coordinating Council, the Department of Technology, Management and Budget, or grant entities. The period was January 1, 2022 to the present.
The office’s disposition, item by item, is a study in how much of a request can be answered with the word “none.” Of the six numbered items, one was granted in full, two were granted in part and denied in part, and three were denied outright. The two grants that matter are narrow: the count of cases that went to trial, and two blank forms. Everything else — the offer counts, the acceptance rates, the policies, the metrics, the reports to Lansing — the office says does not exist.
Three sentences carry the response. The first is the concession that sits inside the denial:
“The underlying data that would allow for the number to be derived is available and in the possession of the Prosecutor’s Office.”
The second is the admission about the case-management system, and it is the most important sentence in the packet:
“Prior to the transition to ProsecutorbyKarpel, the in-house case tracking system did not document plea offer details in anyway. That information was not transitioned from one system to the other, because it simply did not exist. Moreover, plea detail information is not entered directly into ProsectuorbyKarpel. (i.e. the information is NOT entered at this time by Prosecutor’s Office staff into a data field).”
The third is the footnote that appears on every line of the itemization:
“Please note, that this estimate applies to this FOIA Request, but that should payment be made on the estimate related to FOIA Request 25-277, the documents in this request would be captured in that review, making this estimate moot. This would only apply in the instance that the fee estimate was paid related to Request 25-277.”
Read together, those three sentences say something the office did not intend to say. The data exists, but the office does not capture it in a field, so answering the request would require building the dataset from correspondence rather than querying a system. That is a records-management fact, and it is a real answer. But it is not the answer the office gave in its certificate, and it is not the answer that justifies a $23,146.66 invoice for a review the office says is already covered by a different invoice.
What was asked, and how the office answered
The request is dated November 25, 2025. The TelNet fax portal receipt in the packet records the transmission at 6:01:58 p.m. on November 25, 2025, four pages received, to 906-789-5197. The office’s Notice of Denial records the request as received on 11/26/2025. The response letter is dated December 18, 2025, on Delta County Prosecutor’s Office letterhead naming Lauren M. Wickman as Prosecuting Attorney and Civil Counsel, Beth Wickwire as Chief Assistant Prosecutor and Deputy Civil Counsel, and Lauren Mattson as Assistant Prosecutor. It is signed by Emily DeSalvo as FOIA Coordinator, contact number 906-789-5100.
The letter states that “An extension was filed on December 3, 2025 by the Public Body.” Unlike FOIA 25-277, where the same sentence appeared and the notice was missing from the envelope, this time the notice is in the packet. It is at page 28, and it reads: “We are extending the date to respond to your FOIA request for no more than 10 business days.” That is a material difference between the two packets, and this page records it. On this request the office can show its extension. On the other, filed the same day by the same requester, it could not.
The six numbered items, as the request framed them, and the disposition on each:
| Item | What was requested | Disposition |
|---|---|---|
| A(1) | Databases, logs or reports tracking the number of plea offers made, the number resolved by plea, the number proceeding to trial, and acceptance or rejection rates, January 1, 2022 to present. | Granted in part, denied in part. No record of offer counts, plea resolutions or acceptance rates exists; the underlying data does. The third element — cases proceeding to trial — was granted and produced as a four-year table. |
| A(2) | Any export, report or data field from the case-management system showing plea offer details, charges before and after the offer, sentencing ranges offered, and the final plea outcome. | Granted in part, denied in part. No such export, report or field exists. The office states that plea detail was never documented in the old system and is not entered into ProsecutorByKarpel. |
| B(3) | Policies, manuals, SOPs, memoranda, checklists or training materials on standardized plea offers, sentencing ranges, enhancement, reduction and withdrawal guidelines, and mandatory minimums. | Denied. No such policy or training material exists. The office notes this is identical to FOIA 25-178, which was appealed to the Delta County Board and upheld. |
| B(4) | Templates or form letters for plea offers or for notices withdrawing a plea offer. | Granted. Two responsive records produced: SCAO Form MC 414, Plea Agreement / Sentence Agreement, and a People’s Notification of Revocation of Plea Offer template. |
| C(5) | KPI reports on plea resolution rates, prosecutor performance tied to plea bargaining, trial-to-plea ratios, and timeliness or efficiency. | Denied. No such report exists, on any of the four measures. |
| C(6) | Statistical reports sent to external agencies — MPACC, DTMB, grant entities — concerning plea bargaining or case outcomes. | Denied. No such report exists. |
| Note | “Note on System Migration Delays”: all data exports, backups and legacy extractions; all documentation of migration status, including what data has not been imported and why; and any record indicating that plea-bargaining, Brady/Giglio or case-tracking fields were rendered inaccessible. | Granted in part, denied in part. All three sub-items denied as records that do not exist, each with a certificate. The office then volunteered a substantive paragraph describing the migration, which is discussed below. |
Two things about the request itself matter for what follows. First, it was not a fishing expedition. It asked for the records a prosecutor’s office would keep if it managed plea bargaining as a process rather than a series of individual negotiations: offer counts, acceptance rates, a policy manual, a template. Second, it came with a written public-interest justification, a non-commercial certification, and a fee waiver request under MCL 15.234. The office’s itemization contains a section for recording the waiver decision. That section is blank — the same blank that appears on the 25-277 itemization issued the same day.
The paper trail
The packet is 39 pages. It contains a fifteen-page response letter, the Notice of Denial, two excerpts of MCL 15.240, a blank FOIA Appeal Form, the county’s written FOIA policies and forms notice, a seven-page Detailed Cost Itemization, a Notice to Extend Response Time, an intentionally blank page, the TelNet fax receipt, the four-page request, and the two responsive forms. It is the most complete packet in this archive: for the first time, the extension notice the letter describes is actually inside the envelope.
| Page(s) | Document | What it establishes |
|---|---|---|
| 1–15 | Response letter, dated December 18, 2025 | The item-by-item disposition, the trial count, the migration paragraph, the prior-request cross-references, and the fee. |
| 16 | Notice of Denial of FOIA Request | Request 25-278; date received 11/26/2025; date of notice 12/18/2025; received via fax; contact Emily DeSalvo, 906-789-5100. |
| 17, 19 | MCL 15.240 excerpts | The appeal right and the fee-shifting and punitive-damages provisions. |
| 18 | FOIA Appeal Form (blank) | The general appeal mechanism, unexecuted. |
| 20, 30 | County written FOIA policies and forms notice | The county’s general FOIA procedure. |
| 21–27 | Detailed Cost Itemization, seven pages | $16,533.33 locate, $6,613.33 redact, $23,146.66 subtotal, $11,573.33 deposit, 180-day estimate. Waiver section blank. The “moot” footnote on every line. |
| 28 | Notice to Extend Response Time | Ten business days, received via fax. Present in this packet, unlike 25-277. |
| 29 | Intentionally blank page | Nothing. |
| 31–32 | TelNet fax portal receipt | November 25, 2025, 6:01:58 p.m., four pages, to 906-789-5197. |
| 33–36 | The original request, four pages | Six numbered items in three groups; format of production; fee waiver; segregability; certification; certificate of service dated November 25, 2025. |
| 37–38 | SCAO Form MC 414, Plea Agreement / Sentence Agreement (Rev. 1/21) | The state plea-agreement form, produced as responsive to item B(4). |
| 39 | People’s Notification of Revocation of Plea Offer (template) | A blank template with a signature line for Lauren M. Wickman, P79974, produced as responsive to item B(4). |
The packet is also the first in this archive to include the extension notice, and that deserves a note in the office’s favor. A ten-business-day extension from a November 26 receipt runs to roughly December 11; a five-business-day response period runs to December 4. The December 18 response is past both. But the extension notice in the packet is dated December 3, which is within the original five-day window, and the letter relies on it. Whether December 18 falls inside “no more than 10 business days” from December 3 is a question the packet does not resolve — ten business days from December 3 runs to about December 17, and the response is dated December 18. This page records the dates and does not resolve the one-day question, because the record does not.
The twin of 25-277
This is the finding that organizes everything else on this page. FOIA 25-278 is not an isolated request. It is the twin of FOIA 25-277, and the two should be read side by side.
| Fact | FOIA 25-277 | FOIA 25-278 |
|---|---|---|
| Requester | Same individual | Same individual |
| Request dated | November 25, 2025 | November 25, 2025 |
| Faxed | 5:52:24 p.m. and 7:59:42 p.m. | 6:01:58 p.m. |
| Received | November 26, 2025 | November 26, 2025 |
| Response dated | December 18, 2025 | December 18, 2025 |
| Signed by | Emily DeSalvo, FOIA Coordinator | Emily DeSalvo, FOIA Coordinator |
| Subject | Annual statistical reports on clearance, backlog, conviction and acquittal rates | Plea bargaining practices, offers, policies and metrics |
| Core formula | No compilation exists; the underlying data does; exemption determined after review | No compilation exists; the underlying data does; exemption determined after review |
| Volume premise | “approximately 1000 cases/year (6 YEARS requested)” | “approximately 1000 cases/year (4 YEARS requested)” |
| Fee quoted | $34,720.00 | $23,146.66 |
| Deposit required | $17,360.00 | $11,573.33 |
| Waiver section | Blank | Blank |
| Extension notice in packet | No | Yes, page 28 |
Fourteen of those fifteen rows match. The one that does not — the extension notice — is a difference in the office’s favor on this packet and against it on the other. Everything else is the same: the same requester, the same filing day, the same receipt day, the same response day, the same coordinator, the same three-part formula, the same volume premise, the same blank waiver section. Two requests, filed four minutes apart, answered in two letters that are structurally interchangeable.
That consistency is itself the finding, and it cuts two ways. In the office’s favor, it shows that the office treats similar requests similarly, which is what a FOIA process should do. Against the office, it shows that the “no compilation exists, but the data does, and the exemption is determined after you pay” formula is not a reasoned response to a particular request. It is a template. The same sentences answer a request about clearance rates and a request about plea offers, because the sentences were written before either request arrived. A template applied to two different subjects is not a determination about either.
And then there is the money. Two invoices, issued the same day, to the same requester, for what the office itself says is one review:
| Request | Fee quoted | Deposit required | Files priced |
|---|---|---|---|
| FOIA 25-277 | $34,720.00 | $17,360.00 | 6,000 |
| FOIA 25-278 | $23,146.66 | $11,573.33 | 4,000 |
| Combined | $57,866.66 | $28,933.33 | 10,000 priced, one review |
The 25-278 itemization does not hide this. On every one of its sixteen lines, footnotes 4, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15 repeat the same concession: if the 25-277 estimate is paid, “the documents in this request would be captured in that review, making this estimate moot.” The office knows the two requests overlap. It says so, six times, in the document that bills for both. And it issued both anyway, the same day, each with its own deposit requirement, each with its own 180-day clock.
What a requester is left holding is two envelopes that each say the other one covers the work. Pay both and you have paid twice for one review. Pay neither and you have paid nothing and received nothing. Pay one and the office has said, in writing, that the other is moot — but it has not said which one to pay, or that paying one discharges the other. The redundancy is disclosed and then left standing.
The one thing granted: sixty-two trials
Item A(1) asked for the number of cases that proceed to trial. That element the office granted. It produced a table, and it explained where the numbers came from: “following a review of the internal calendar of the Prosecutor’s Office.” Not a review of 4,000 files. A review of the calendar.
The table counts trials by court and year. The office defined what it counted: “The number of trials includes any jury trials in District, Circuit or Probate Court, any Abuse/Neglect Proceedings categorized as trials, or any entries of pleas as charged on the day of trial.” A footnote fixes the cutoff: “Trials through December 18, 2025.”
Read the table as a whole and a picture emerges that the office did not draw. Trials fell from 18 in 2022 and 19 in 2023 to 12 in 2024 and 13 in 2025. The drop is almost entirely in Probate Court, where abuse and neglect trials went from ten and nine to three and three. Circuit felony trials fell from seven to four and held there. District misdemeanor trials rose from one to six and held there. Over four years the office took 62 cases to trial while, by its own account, handling roughly 1,000 cases a year — which is to say roughly 4,000 cases in the period, and 62 trials, or about one and a half percent.
That ratio is the answer to a question the office said it could not answer. Item C(5) asked for trial-to-plea ratios. The office denied it as a report that does not exist. But the numerator is in the table the office produced, and the denominator is the case volume the office asserts on its own itemization. A requester who wanted the trial-to-plea ratio could compute it from two documents the office issued the same day. The office declined to compute it, and then billed $23,146.66 for a review that would, on its own description, produce the very numbers it had already put in a table.
The invoice, which this time is arithmetically correct
This page has criticized the office’s fee arithmetic before. In FOIA 25-254 the criticism was that the office treated minutes as quarter hours and inflated its demand fifteenfold. That criticism does not apply here. On this itemization the multiplication is right, and saying so is part of keeping an honest record.
| Line | Item | Basis | Amount |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Employee labor to locate | 4,000 files × 10 minutes = 2,666.66 quarter-hour increments × $6.20 | $16,533.33 |
| 2 | Employee labor to review and separate | None charged | $0.00 |
| 3a | Employee labor to redact | 4,000 files × 4 minutes = 1,066.66 increments × $6.20 | $6,613.33 |
| 3b | Contract labor for redaction | None | $0.00 |
| 4 | Copying | None charged | $0.00 |
| 5 | Mailing | None | $0.00 |
| Subtotal | $23,146.66 | ||
| Good-faith deposit (50%) | $11,573.33 | ||
| Estimated time to complete after deposit | 180 days |
The rate is disclosed and it is correct. The hourly wage with fringe benefits is $24.82, billed at $6.20 per quarter-hour increment, which is $24.82 divided by four and rounded down. The deposit is exactly half the subtotal, as MCL 15.234(3) permits. Every line computes from its stated basis. An archive that criticizes fee arithmetic has to say so when the arithmetic is right, and here it is right.
The handwritten justifications are also more specific than in earlier packets. For line 1: “approximately 1000 cases/year (4 YEARS requested) to locate the request in this particular instance. Approximately 10 minutes per file.” For line 3a: “information of a personal nature that could clearly constitute a violation of an individual’s privacy (MCL 15.243(1)(a)). Will appear on all documents located. Approximately 4 minutes per file.”
Two things about those justifications deserve scrutiny. The first is the redaction rationale. Line 3a asserts that personal information “will appear on all documents located” — a categorical claim about 4,000 files the office has not yet examined, since the redaction is to be performed after the deposit clears. An exemption determination made before the review it depends on is not a determination; it is a prediction. And it is a prediction about a request whose granted portion produced two blank forms and a table of counts, none of which contains a single personal identifier. The office is charging $6,613.33 to redact personal information from documents that, on its own description of what it holds, may not contain any.
The second is the volume. Four thousand files is the premise of the entire invoice, and it is asserted, not counted. That is the subject of the next section.
Four thousand files, sixty-two trials
The invoice prices a review of 4,000 files. The office derived that figure from “approximately 1000 cases/year” over four years. Set it beside what the same response actually produced.
To answer item A(1)’s trial question, the office did not review 4,000 files. It read “the internal calendar.” To answer item B(4)’s template question, it did not review 4,000 files. It pulled two forms. To answer items A(2), B(3), C(5), C(6) and the migration note, it did not review 4,000 files. It certified that the records do not exist. Every part of the response that was actually answered was answered from sources other than a file-by-file review: a calendar, a forms folder, and a certificate. The 4,000-file review is priced but never performed, because on the office’s own account it was never necessary.
This is the sixth appearance in this archive of the “approximately 1,000 cases per year” figure. It appears in FOIA 25-215, in 25-244, in 25-254 (where it was paired with a units error that inflated the demand fifteenfold), in 26-22, in 25-277, and now here. In none of those six responses does the office show a count, a query output, a docket total or an annual report behind the number. It is asserted, multiplied, and billed.
The 25-278 packet makes the gap visible in a way the earlier packets did not, because it puts the premise and the product in the same envelope. The premise is 4,000 files at ten minutes to locate and four to redact, for $23,146.66. The product is 62 trials, two blank forms, and six certificates of nonexistence. The office priced a mountain and delivered a page.
The paragraph the office volunteered
The most interesting part of this response is the part the office did not have to write. The “Note on System Migration Delays” asked for records about the migration to ProsecutorByKarpel: exports, backups, documentation of what had not been imported and why, and any record showing that plea-bargaining, Brady/Giglio or case-tracking fields had been rendered inaccessible. All three sub-items were denied as records that do not exist, each with a formal certificate. A footnote adds: “Please note this was confirmed with the IT Department.”
Then, below the certificates, the office wrote a paragraph that answers the substance of the question anyway:
“The data transition or migration was completed in June 2024. The issue is not with the data being migrated, but with the information from one system not matching with all data fields or areas in the new system. Moreover, there are more data fields available in ProsecutorbyKarpel than in the previous case management system. … There are still mistakes and issues being found with the migrated information on nearly a weekly basis due to the age of the case at issue and what information was originally inputted into the old system.”
And then the sentence that explains why the plea data does not exist:
“The old case tracking system did not have data fields related to the tracking of plea-bargaining or Brady/Giglio. This information was never inputted into that system, so there was no information to migrate.”
That is a real answer, and it is a better answer than the certificate. It says: the office never tracked plea bargaining as data. Not before Karpel, not after. The old system had no field for it, so nothing was migrated; the new system has fields, but staff do not enter plea detail into them. The reason there is no record of how many plea offers the office makes is not that the record is exempt. It is that the office never made one. That is a records-management fact, and it is the kind of fact a FOIA response is supposed to surface.
The problem is that the office buried it under a certificate of nonexistence. The certificate says the records do not exist, which is true and which closes the request. The paragraph says why they do not exist, which is the useful part, and it is offered as an aside. A requester reading only the disposition would conclude that the office searched and found nothing. A requester reading the paragraph would conclude that the office never kept the thing in the first place — which is a different and more consequential finding, because it means the absence is a design choice about what to record, not an accident of search.
There is also a tension with the June 2024 date. ProsecutorByKarpel went live in June 2024, and the office says the migration was completed then. The request period is January 1, 2022 to present, so roughly two and a half years of the window predate the system. This page does not fault the office for how those earlier years were kept; the system did not exist. But the office’s own paragraph says that even in the new system, plea detail is not entered into a field. So the request period spans a before, in which the data was never captured, and an after, in which the capability exists but is unused. The absence is continuous across both.
A denial form, and an appeal nobody was told how to file
Page 16 is the state-issued Notice of Denial form. It records request number 25-278, date received 11/26/2025, date of notice 12/18/2025, received via fax, contact Emily DeSalvo at 906-789-5100. In the field for the records requested it refers to the attached request.
The form’s reason boxes are printed with marks that appear, on pixel inspection, in both the 25-277 and 25-278 packets identically — which means the marks are a pre-printed artifact of the form and not a record of which reasons the office selected. This page therefore does not assert which boxes are checked. What the form does say in its text is more useful than the boxes: the redaction reason describes the personal information to be removed as “defendant names, victim or witness names, addresses, dates of births, telephone numbers, etc,” and states that “any determination of the exact exemptions would be conducted after payment of the fee estimate.”
That sentence is the clearest statement in the packet of how the office sequences its work. The exemption determination comes after payment. The office does not know, when it issues the invoice, what it will redact or why. It knows only that it will redact something, at four minutes a file, for $6,613.33. A requester is asked to pay for a determination that has not been made, on documents that have not been reviewed, under an exemption that has not been applied.
The appeal notice is standard and it is reproduced twice. “If you disagree with this decision, you may submit an appeal to the chairperson of the Delta County Board of Commissioners, or seek judicial review in the Delta County Circuit Court,” with the reminder that a court may award punitive damages of $1,000.00. What the packet does not include is the Fee Appeal Form or the text of MCL 15.240a — the same omission as in 25-277. A requester who wanted to appeal the $23,146.66 fee had the general appeal form and no fee-specific mechanism, in a packet that is otherwise the most complete in this archive.
The waiver section, blank again
The request asked for a fee waiver under MCL 15.234(1), on public-interest grounds, with a written justification and a non-commercial certification. The county’s itemization has a section for recording the waiver decision. It is blank. So is the identical section on the 25-277 itemization issued the same day.
A blank section is not a denial with reasons. It is the absence of a decision. Under MCL 15.234(7) a public body may waive or reduce a fee where the request is in the public interest and not primarily commercial, and the statute contemplates that the body will make and record that determination. An office that leaves the section blank has neither granted nor denied the waiver; it has simply not addressed it, and the full fee stands by default. That is the same practice this archive has recorded in every fee packet the office has issued, and it is now documented twice on the same day for the same requester.
The opinion: two invoices for one review
Here is the finding this page exists to record. FOIA 25-277 and FOIA 25-278 are the same request in two costumes. They were filed by the same person four minutes apart on the same evening. They were received the same day. They were answered the same day, by the same coordinator, with letters built from the same sentences. They multiply the same volume premise — approximately 1,000 cases a year — by the same per-file times, on the same form, at the same rate. And they were billed separately: $34,720.00 and $23,146.66, $57,866.66 together, $28,933.33 in deposits.
The office’s own footnote says this should not have happened. Six times, on sixteen lines, the 25-278 itemization concedes that paying the 25-277 estimate “would capture” the 25-278 documents and make the second estimate “moot.” The office knew the two requests overlapped. It wrote the overlap into the invoice. And it issued both invoices anyway, each with its own deposit, each with its own 180-day clock, each standing on its own as a demand the requester had to satisfy or abandon.
That is the move, and it is a different move from the ones this archive has documented before. In earlier packets the office recharacterized a request as something more expensive and let the deposit do the refusing. Here the office did that twice, for two requests that are one request, and then disclosed in writing that one payment would cover both — without telling the requester which payment, or treating either as satisfying the other. A requester facing $28,933.33 in deposits for work the office says is one review has been handed a reason to walk away that is larger than either invoice alone. The redundancy is not a discount. It is a second wall.
The trial table sharpens the point. The one substantive thing the office produced — 62 trials over four years — it produced from a calendar, in what must have been a short search, without reviewing 4,000 files. That is the answer to a question the office said would cost $23,146.66 to answer. The office found it for free, because the calendar already existed. Which means the 4,000-file review priced on the itemization was never the method by which this request would be answered. It was the method by which the request would be priced. Those are not the same thing, and the difference between them is $23,146.66.
And the volume premise underneath it all is the same premise this archive has now recorded six times. Approximately 1,000 cases a year, asserted, never counted. In 25-254 the premise was hidden behind a units error. Here the arithmetic is clean and the premise is exposed, and the exposure shows what the premise is for: it is the multiplier that converts a request the office does not want to answer into an invoice large enough that the requester will stop asking. Sixty-two trials is what the office actually had. Four thousand files is what it charged to look for them.
None of this requires imputing bad faith. It requires only noting that the office controls the characterization of the work, the estimate of its cost, and the decision whether to waive the cost; that it has now issued two invoices for one review and said so in writing; and that it has left the waiver section blank on both. A process in which one party sets the scope, sets the price twice, records no reasons, and discloses the redundancy without resolving it is a process that cannot be reviewed. That is the transparency problem this archive documents, and 25-278 is its clearest instance yet — not because the arithmetic is wrong, but because the arithmetic is right and the invoice is still for work the office did not do.
What the office got right
A record that only counts failures is not a record, and this response does several things properly — more than most in this archive.
The extension notice is in the packet. For the first time, the office produced the document its letter describes. That is a real improvement over 25-277, where the same sentence appeared and the notice was missing, and it is worth saying plainly.
The trial count was produced, and it was produced honestly. The office could have denied item A(1) in full, as it denied so much else. Instead it granted the trial element, produced a four-year table by court, defined what it counted, and fixed the cutoff date. That is a genuine production, and it is the reason this page can make the argument it makes.
The migration paragraph is candid. The office did not have to explain that the old system never tracked plea bargaining, or that staff do not enter plea detail into Karpel, or that migration errors are still surfacing weekly. It volunteered all of it. That paragraph is the most useful thing in the packet, and it is the office’s own words.
The rate is disclosed and the arithmetic is correct. $24.82 an hour with fringe, $6.20 per quarter hour, with the conversion shown. The deposit is exactly half, as the statute permits. In an archive where fee forms often omit the rate entirely, that is what made the invoice checkable at all.
The prior-request cross-references are disclosed rather than concealed. The response names 25-94, 25-136 and 25-178, and it tells the requester that 25-178 was appealed and the denial upheld. Naming the prior requests lets a requester see what ground has been covered. The problem is that the ground covered does not include the plea-offer data this request asked for, but the disclosure itself is to the office’s credit.
The criticism on this page is therefore narrow and specific. It is not that the office refused to produce plea data. It is that the office produced a certificate, a calendar count and two blank forms, priced a 4,000-file review it did not perform, issued a second invoice its own footnote calls moot, and left the waiver blank — twice, on the same day, for the same requester.
How this compares to the rest of the archive
At $23,146.66, this is the fourth-largest fee demand in the archive, behind 25-254 and 25-244 at $74,520.00 each and 25-194 at $63,028.80. It is ahead of 25-277 at $34,720.00 only when the two are combined: together they are $57,866.66, which would be the second-largest demand in the archive if treated as one.
What distinguishes 25-278 is not the size but the pairing. Every other fee packet in this archive stands alone. This one cannot be read without the packet issued beside it, because the two are the same review billed twice. That is a new fact in the record, and it is the fact that makes the volume premise visible. When one request is priced at $34,720.00 for 6,000 files and another at $23,146.66 for 4,000 files, and the office says the second is subsumed by the first, the arithmetic of the two invoices together — 10,000 files priced, 62 trials produced — is the arithmetic of a fee schedule that does not track the work.
On the substance, this is the first request in the archive that asked the office how it plea bargains, and the answer is that the office does not record it. Earlier requests asked for charging decisions, backlog information, statistical material provided to the Board, and annual reports. This one asked for the internal machinery of plea negotiation — offers, acceptances, ranges, policies, metrics — and the office answered that none of it is captured. That is a finding about how the office manages its own core function, and the office made it about itself, in a paragraph it did not have to write.
The legal framework, in plain terms
The statutes below are the ones the response relies on, plus the ones that govern the parts of the response that are missing. They are set out so a reader can check the analysis against the text rather than against this page’s summary of it.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.233(1) requires a public body, upon written request, to provide a requesting person a reasonable opportunity to inspect or copy a public record. The right attaches to records the public body keeps, and it is not conditioned on the requester’s purpose. This is the provision that makes the migration paragraph significant: if the office keeps plea offers only as correspondence and forms rather than as database fields, then the records responsive to a plea-offer request are those documents, whatever the office chooses to call them, and the request reaches them.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.233(4) and (5) address the situation in which a requested record does not exist. A public body may certify that it has searched and found nothing, and it must do so in writing. The certification is a denial for purposes of appeal, and the requester’s remedy is to challenge the adequacy of the search. The certificates in this response are formally proper. The question they raise is not formal: it is whether a search that produces “no record of plea offers” from an office that concedes “the underlying data that would allow for the number to be derived is available” was a search for the record or a search for the field.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.234(1) permits a public body to charge for the cost of searching for, locating and examining records, for review and separation of exempt from nonexempt information, and for copying. The statute requires that a public body not charge more than the actual cost of responding. On this itemization the computation from the stated method is correct and the rate is disclosed. What the “actual cost” language reaches is the premise and the pairing: a cost estimate built on an assumed volume is an extrapolation from an assumption, and a second estimate that the office says is subsumed by the first is not the actual cost of a separate response.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.234(3) permits a deposit of up to one-half the projected fee where the estimate exceeds fifty dollars. The 50 percent deposit here is exactly what the statute allows. But the statute permits a deposit against a projected fee for a response; where the office has said in writing that one request’s documents “would be captured” by another request’s review, two deposits against two projected fees for one review raise a question the statute does not answer and the office did not address.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.234(4) permits a public body to charge for the cost of reviewing records where failing to do so would result in unreasonably high costs beyond those typically incurred. This is the provision that authorizes charging for redaction time, and the office invoked it for line 3a. Its use is not improper on its face. The difficulty is that line 3a asserts that personal information “will appear on all documents located” — a categorical assertion about 4,000 files the office has not examined, since the redaction is to be performed after payment, and the Notice of Denial confirms that “any determination of the exact exemptions would be conducted after payment of the fee estimate.” An exemption determination made before the review it depends on is not a determination; it is an assumption about what the review will find.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.234(7) permits a public body to waive or reduce a fee where the request is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of government and is not primarily in the requester’s commercial interest. The request asked for a waiver on this basis, in writing, with a public-interest justification and a non-commercial certification. The county’s own form contains a section for recording the decision. That section is blank. A blank section is not a denial with reasons; it is the absence of a decision, and it leaves the full fee standing without any reviewable rationale.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.235(2) requires a public body to respond within five business days, either by granting, denying, or granting in part and denying in part. MCL 15.235(4) permits a ten-business-day extension by written notice specifying the new date. Here, unlike 25-277, the extension notice is in the packet at page 28, and it states that the office is extending “for no more than 10 business days.” The notice is dated December 3, 2025, within the original five-day window. Whether a December 18 response falls inside ten business days from December 3 is a close question the packet does not resolve, and this page does not resolve it either.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.235(6) provides that the response period is tolled while a required deposit is outstanding. This is the provision that gives a 180-day estimate its practical effect. A deposit of $11,573.33, if unpaid, suspends the clock indefinitely; if paid, it converts a six-week response into a six-month one. The statute permits the tolling. It does not require an estimate of 180 days, and it does not relieve the office of the obligation to explain how the estimate was derived.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.243(1)(a) exempts information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual’s privacy. This is an ordinary and defensible ground for redacting victim and witness identifiers from case files. It is a less obvious ground for redacting a table of trial counts or a blank state form. The one substantive production in this packet — the trial table — contains no personal identifier at all. If the office intends to redact personal information from documents responsive to this request, it should say which personal information would appear in a document that consists of numbers and blank forms.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.240(1) gives a requester the right to appeal a denial, in whole or in part, to the head of the public body or to the circuit court. A certificate of nonexistence is a denial for these purposes, and a partial denial is appealable as to the part denied. MCL 15.240(6) allows a court to award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a requester who prevails in an action to compel disclosure, and MCL 15.240(7) allows punitive damages of $1,000 where a public body has arbitrarily and capriciously violated the act. The response reproduces both provisions. The 180-day window to sue runs from December 18, 2025.
Michigan law — the statutory framework applied here
Legal interpretation: MCL 15.240a governs an appeal of a fee, including a deposit requirement. It permits a requester to appeal a fee to the head of the public body and, if the appeal is denied, to seek judicial review. The 25-278 packet includes the general FOIA Appeal Form but not the Fee Appeal Form or the text of MCL 15.240a. The mechanism therefore existed but was not documented in the envelope, which matters because a fee appeal is the natural vehicle for the defects described on this page — the unmeasured volume premise and the redundant second invoice are both visible on the face of the itemization.
Authorities and sources cited on this page
Show the statutes, cases, and sources cited on this page
Every factual statement above is drawn from the documents the office produced, and every legal statement is drawn from the Michigan Freedom of Information Act as cited. The sources are:
- FOIA request 25-278, dated November 25, 2025, four pages: six numbered items in three groups (plea offer data and tracking; sentencing ranges, offers and policies; internal analytics and performance metrics), a note on system migration delays, a format-of-production section, a fee waiver request under MCL 15.234, a segregability provision under MCL 15.243(4), a non-commercial certification, and a certificate of service dated November 25, 2025.
- TelNet fax portal receipt, November 25, 2025, 6:01:58 p.m., four pages received, to 906-789-5197.
- Response letter of December 18, 2025 from the Delta County Prosecutor’s Office, signed by Emily DeSalvo, FOIA Coordinator, naming Lauren M. Wickman as Prosecuting Attorney and Civil Counsel, Beth Wickwire as Chief Assistant Prosecutor and Deputy Civil Counsel, and Lauren Mattson as Assistant Prosecutor.
- Notice to Extend Response Time, page 28 of the packet, dated December 3, 2025, extending the response period “for no more than 10 business days,” received via fax.
- Notice of Denial of FOIA Request form, request 25-278, date received 11/26/2025, date of notice 12/18/2025, received via fax; contact Emily DeSalvo, 906-789-5100. The redaction reason describes “defendant names, victim or witness names, addresses, dates of births, telephone numbers, etc” and states that “any determination of the exact exemptions would be conducted after payment of the fee estimate.” The reason-box marks are a pre-printed form artifact and are not relied on.
- Detailed Cost Itemization, seven pages, dated December 18, 2025: 2,666.66 increments locate at $6.20 for $16,533.33; 1,066.66 increments redact at $6.20 for $6,613.33; $23,146.66 subtotal; $11,573.33 deposit; 180-day estimate; hourly rate $24.82 with fringe; Public Interest waiver section blank. Handwritten justification for line 1 reads “approximately 1000 cases/year (4 YEARS requested) to locate the request in this particular instance. Approximately 10 minutes per file.” For line 3a: “information of a personal nature that could clearly constitute a violation of an individual’s privacy (MCL 15.243(1)(a)). Will appear on all documents located. Approximately 4 minutes per file.” Footnotes 4, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15 repeat: “should payment be made on the estimate related to FOIA Request 25-277, the documents in this request would be captured in that review, making this estimate moot.”
- Trial table in the response letter, pages 4–5: District Court 1, 6, 5, 6; Probate Court 10, 9, 3, 3; Circuit Court 7, 4, 4, 4 for 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025; totals 18, 19, 12 and 13; 62 across four years; “Trials through December 18, 2025.” The office states the counts come from “a review of the internal calendar of the Prosecutor’s Office.”
- SCAO Form MC 414, Plea Agreement / Sentence Agreement (Rev. 1/21), pages 37–38, produced as responsive to item B(4).
- People’s Notification of Revocation of Plea Offer (template), page 39, produced as responsive to item B(4).
- MCL 15.240 excerpts at pages 17 and 19; blank FOIA Appeal Form at page 18; county written FOIA policies and forms notice at pages 20 and 30.
- FOIA 25-277, response of December 18, 2025, and its Detailed Cost Itemization, for the comparison of the two invoices and the shared volume premise.
- FOIA 25-94, FOIA 25-136 and FOIA 25-178, invoked in the response as substantially similar prior requests, with 25-136 and 25-178 noted as appealed to the Delta County Board of Commissioners and upheld.
- Michigan Freedom of Information Act, MCL 15.231 through 15.246, in particular MCL 15.233, 15.234, 15.235, 15.240, 15.240a and 15.243.
The redacted copies of the response letter, the denial and appeal forms, the fee itemization with the extension notice, the request with its fax receipt, and the responsive forms are linked under Documents below. Requester identifying information has been removed from the published copies; the substance of the response is unchanged.
What would move this forward
Four follow-ups would resolve most of what is unresolved on this page, and each is narrow enough to be answerable.
The first is the count. A one-page request asking only for the number of cases the office handled in each year from 2022 through 2025 — a single number per year, no names, no case numbers, no documents — would either produce four figures or a certificate. If it produces figures, the “approximately 1,000 cases per year” premise can be checked against the 62 trials the office has already reported, and the trial-to-plea ratio the office denied in item C(5) can be computed from two numbers. If it produces a certificate, then the office has certified that it does not know how many cases it handles, which is itself a finding of consequence.
The second is the calendar. A request asking for the internal calendar entries the office used to produce the 62-trial count — not the underlying case files, just the calendar entries that were already read to answer item A(1) — would test whether the count can be audited. The office has already said it read the calendar. Asking to see what it read is the smallest possible follow-up to a production the office volunteered.
The third is the waiver. A request asking the office to record its public-interest waiver determination on both the 25-277 and 25-278 itemizations, with reasons, under MCL 15.234(7) — not to grant the waiver, just to decide it in writing — requires no new records and no new search. It asks the office to fill in a blank section on two forms it has already issued. That is the smallest possible request in this archive, and its answer would establish whether the blank is an oversight or a practice.
The fourth is the pairing. A request asking the office to state, in writing, whether payment of the 25-277 estimate discharges the 25-278 estimate, and if not, why not — given the office’s own footnote saying the second is “moot” if the first is paid — requires no records at all. It asks the office to reconcile two documents it issued the same day. That answer would establish whether the double invoice is a clerical artifact or a practice, and it is the question a requester facing $28,933.33 in deposits would ask first.
Until one of those produces a document, the record stands as it is: a certificate that no plea-offer data exists, a concession that the underlying data does, a paragraph explaining that the office never captured the data in the first place, a four-year trial count of 62 produced from a calendar, two blank forms, a $23,146.66 itemization whose arithmetic is correct and whose volume premise has never been counted, an $11,573.33 deposit, a 180-day estimate, a waiver section left blank, a fee appeal form missing from the envelope, and a footnote on every line conceding that the whole invoice is moot if the twin invoice issued the same day is paid.
Documents
These are redacted copies prepared for publication. Requester names, home addresses, personal phone numbers, and email addresses have been removed. Unredacted originals are not hosted on the public web server.
Related FOIA requests
- FOIA 26-292 — FOIA 26-292: The office used the requester's own cost-saving clause to withdraw the request, then offered to grant it if he removed the clause (Granted in part, denied in part — no records produced; the office conceded the data exists and refused the aggregate on the ground that the requester's own scope limitation excluded it, October 25, 2026)
- FOIA 26-291 — FOIA 26-291: The office answered a request for a privilege log with nine document titles — and cited a subsection of the FOIA that does not exist (Granted in part — a nine-row title-and-date table supplying two of the eleven requested fields, no count, and a citation to a subsection of MCL 15.243 that does not exist, October 25, 2026)
- FOIA 26-290 — FOIA 26-290: The office refused the victim-services records because it says you already have them — from a packet that contained none (Refused — five paragraphs labelled “granted” but zero pages produced, on the authority of a prior production that contained no responsive documents; the sixth paragraph received no disposition, October 25, 2026)
- FOIA 26-131 — FOIA 26-131: Twenty case files, priced at $82.66 before a single page is copied (Granted in part — release conditioned on a $41.33 deposit; no records produced yet, April 17, 2026)
- FOIA 26-35 — FOIA 26-35: The office counted 52 pleas in 85 minutes — eight days after saying the same kind of aggregate did not exist (Granted — 52 pleas reported from the District and Circuit Court dockets, no fee quoted, no exemption cited, no pages withheld; the count is over-inclusive by the office's own admission, February 9, 2026)
- FOIA 26-34 — FOIA 26-34: The office denied a count of diversion cases by defining “diversion” down to a programme it does not run (Denied — certificate of nonexistence under MCL 15.233(1), Denial Form box 2 checked, on the ground that the only diversion programme in Delta County is juvenile diversion administered by the Probate Court; no exemption cited, no fee quoted, no waiver determination, February 9, 2026)
- FOIA 26-33 — FOIA 26-33: Asked to count deferred prosecution agreements, the office certified the total nonexistent and priced the underlying data at $9,093.33 (Granted in part and denied in part — the aggregate record denied as requiring creation of a new record, with a certificate of nonexistence and Denial Form box 2 checked; the underlying data granted subject to a $9,093.33 estimate, a $4,546.66 deposit and a 270-day production estimate; public-interest fee waiver left undetermined, February 9, 2026)
- FOIA 26-32 — FOIA 26-32: What the office's own memos say about the migration that broke its records — a 95-page production that answers its own denial (Granted in part, denied in part — five records produced across 95 pages, with only personal contact information redacted under MCL 15.243(1)(a); no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
- FOIA 26-31 — FOIA 26-31: Asked how many crime scenes a prosecutor attended, the office listed eight documents and denied them as duplicative (Denied in full — refused as a duplicative request under Densmore v Department of Corrections, on the ground that the eight listed records were already produced in response to FOIA 25-267; Denial Form box 1 checked with the section 13 subsection left blank; no aggregate figure supplied and no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
- FOIA 26-30 — FOIA 26-30: Eight documents, one number, and a Densmore refusal built on a premise the record does not fully support (Denied — no aggregate total produced; eight responsive documents identified but not reproduced under a Densmore prior-production rationale; no fee quoted, February 6, 2026)
- FOIA 26-29 — FOIA 26-29: A count of inherited convictions the office could not locate — priced at $1,033.33 for the work of counting (No count produced — office could not locate a record; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,033.33 with a $516.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
- FOIA 26-28 — FOIA 26-28: A headcount of cases open when the prosecutor took office — denied, then priced at $1,653.33 on an 800-file baseline (Denied in part, granted in part — no record states the headcount, with a certificate of nonexistence; underlying data granted subject to segregation and priced at $1,653.33 with an $826.66 deposit, February 5, 2026)
- FOIA 26-22 — FOIA 26-22: A conviction rate the office says does not exist, priced at $9,548 (Denied — record does not exist; $9,548 quote for the underlying files, January 30, 2026)
- FOIA 26-21 — FOIA 26-21: A count of convictions the office says does not exist — then a quiet amendment that changed the number behind the bill (Denied as a compilation — no count produced; fee of $9,548.00 quoted for underlying files; amended response revised the volume figure without explanation, January 30, 2026)
- FOIA 26-20 — FOIA 26-20: The aggregate case total, and the records that would let you count it (Denied — record does not exist, January 30, 2026)
- FOIA 25-279 — FOIA 25-279: The office granted the personnel and budget records on paper — then sent three invoices totaling $34,673.79 and none of the records (Granted in part on paper — dozens of records listed as enclosed and none enclosed; three cost itemizations totaling $34,673.79, November 25, 2025)
- FOIA 25-277 — FOIA 25-277: No annual statistical report exists, the underlying data does, and the office prices it at $34,720 (Granted in part — no statistical report exists; the underlying data is granted at a $34,720 estimate built on a volume figure the office has never counted, November 25, 2025)
- FOIA 25-257 — FOIA 25-257: Three certificates of nonexistence, then a $19,840 bill to rebuild the data by hand (Denied — three certificates of nonexistence, with a $19,840 estimate to rebuild the same data by hand, October 31, 2025)
- FOIA 25-254 — FOIA 25-254: Two certificates of nonexistence, two documents produced, and a $74,520 itemization copied from an earlier request (Granted in part, denied in part — two documents produced, two certificates of nonexistence, and a $74,520 estimate identical to FOIA 25-244's, October 31, 2025)
- FOIA 25-244 — FOIA 25-244: Ten service slips, thirteen policy manuals, and a $74,520 quote (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
- FOIA 25-241 — FOIA 25-241: The special-prosecutor petition the office filed, and the 2024 memo that says it did not need another one (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
- FOIA 25-240 — FOIA 25-240: Officer use-of-force referrals, and the $1,863 bill for the one part the office would search (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
- FOIA 25-239 — FOIA 25-239: The Brady/Giglio list and how the office tracks officer credibility (Granted in part, denied in part, October 10, 2025)
- FOIA 25-234 — FOIA 25-234: Four lab reports, two certificates, and 26.4 grams where the press said four ounces (Granted in part, October 1, 2025)
- FOIA 25-202 — FOIA 25-202: No RFP, no bid, no purchase order — and the emails that show how the system was picked (Granted in part, August 18, 2025)
- FOIA 25-201 — FOIA 25-201: ProsecutorByKarpel contracts, invoices, and licensing (Granted in part, denied in part, August 18, 2025)
- FOIA 25-200 — FOIA 25-200: The software the office runs on — seven systems named, one of them retired in June 2024 (Granted in full, August 18, 2025)
- FOIA 25-197 — FOIA 25-197: A request for complaints against the office came back as the office's own civil-rights lawsuits (Granted in part, denied in part, August 13, 2025)
- FOIA 25-196 — FOIA 25-196: Audits of the office, 2019 through 2024 — five county financial statements produced, two fiscal years missing (Granted in part — five annual county financial statements produced; fiscal years 2022 and 2024 absent from the release; no exemption cited and no certificate of nonexistence, August 13, 2025)
- FOIA 25-195 — FOIA 25-195: Reports on the office's own work — four case-tracking reports produced, performance reviews certified nonexistent, county reports withheld as attorney-client (Granted in part and denied in part — ten documents produced; county reports withheld on attorney-client privilege; performance reviews certified nonexistent; $5,961.60 estimated, $2,980.80 deposit, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
- FOIA 25-194 — FOIA 25-194: Every email and text the Prosecutor sent in 2024 — a $63,028.80 estimate on a request the requester offered to narrow (Granted in part and denied in part — exemptions cited; $63,028.80 estimated, $31,514.40 deposit required, 270 days, August 13, 2025)
- FOIA 25-215 — FOIA 25-215: Three answers to one request — two certificates of nonexistence, a grant, and a $13,248 estimate (Granted in part, August 9, 2025)
- FOIA 25-180 — FOIA 25-180: Two boxes checked — the trial records both “already provided” and “do not exist” (Denied in full — certificate of nonexistence plus an exemption box checked; no fee, no pages produced, August 2, 2025)
- FOIA 25-139 — FOIA 25-139: Forfeitures in cases that ended without a conviction, certified not to exist — while the same office took an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
- FOIA 25-137 — FOIA 25-137: The average time from charge to disposition, certified not to exist — after a ten-day extension for “voluminous” records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
- FOIA 25-136 — FOIA 25-136: The plea-agreement count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
- FOIA 25-135 — FOIA 25-135: The office denied the 2024 trial summary as a record that “does not exist” — then produced eight case files on the next page (Granted in part — 8 case files produced, June 27, 2025)
- FOIA 25-134 — FOIA 25-134: The dismissed-case count the office certified does not exist — after taking an extension for the volume of records (Denied in full — certified that the record does not exist; no fee quoted, no pages produced, June 27, 2025)
- FOIA 25-133 — FOIA 25-133: The office certified the monthly count did not exist — then attached an annual one and offered to sell the underlying data for $2,815.20 (Granted in part — one annual screening table produced; monthly counts withheld; $2,815.20 quoted with a $1,407.60 deposit, June 27, 2025)
- FOIA 25-129 — FOIA 25-129: Arraignment-to-disposition times the office certified do not exist, then priced at $2,931.12 (Granted in part — two items denied as nonexistent; $2,931.12 quote on the third, June 26, 2025)
- FOIA 25-118 — FOIA 25-118: Final case outcomes for January and February 2025 (Fee estimate issued, June 18, 2025)
- FOIA 25-94 — Prosecutor Case Outcome Statistics, 2021–2025 (Granted in Part, May 23, 2025)